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ABSTRACT
With the cost of housing rising in urban areas, cities have 
utilized inclusionary programs to increase the supply of affordable 
housing. However, certain features of inclusionary programs are 
subject to takings challenges. In 2015, the California Supreme Court 
upheld an inclusionary program in San Jose. The case was a takings 
challenge to the program’s mandatory construction requirements. 
Under the program, San Jose mandated that all new developments of 
more than twenty units include affordable units. San Jose required 
that 15% of a development’s units be sold at prices affordable to 
low- or moderate-income income individuals. The California Court 
upheld the program on the basis that the requirements mitigated the 
effects of development. More importantly, the California Court 
determined that the requirements furthered the constitutionally 
legitimate purpose of increasing the number of affordable units in 
response to the city’s needs. 
Similarly, the city of Chicago has enacted an inclusionary 
zoning program titled the Affordable Requirements Ordinance. 
Originally passed in 2003, the program was amended in 2007 and, 
most recently, in 2015. The Affordable Requirements Ordinance has 
not remained free from legal challenges, as the Home Builders 
Association of Greater Chicago recently filed suit challenging the 
2007 iteration. The crux of the challenge is a requirement that a 
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developer pay fees to the city’s affordable housing fund in order to 
secure a change in zoning and subsequent building permit. Like the 
case in California, the Chicago case argues that the program’s 
requirements amount to a taking. Despite the challenge to the 2007 
program, Chicago increased the program’s requirements by 
amending the program in 2015. The 2015 changes to the Ordinance 
now require that developers seeking to build in certain locations 
must construct affordable units. The 2015 changes include the 
mandatory construction requirement along with increased fees. As a 
result, the 2015 changes to the Affordable Requirements Ordinance 
expose the city to a Takings Clause challenge.  
Rather than struggling with developers over the 
constitutionality of mandatory construction requirements, 
municipalities can pass new taxes and relax existing zoning 
restrictions to bolster the affordable housing market. By tweaking 
set-backs, floor area ratios, and usage separations, a municipality 
can reduce the cost of construction. As a result, developers may 
construct units at a greater density, which in turn means an increase 
in the total number of units. With more units in a desirable location, 
the price of each unit drops allowing for the socio-economic 
diversity inclusionary programs desire. Additionally, by relaxing use 
restrictions, municipalities allow neighborhoods to develop so that 
housing is within walking distance to schools, workplaces, and 
shopping. Overall, alternatives to mandatory construction 
requirements create affordable units because it becomes economical 
for a developer to do so, not because they are required to do so.  
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INTRODUCTION
In June of 2015, the California Supreme Court upheld the City 
of San Jose’s inclusionary zoning1 program after it was challenged as 
an unconstitutional taking.2 The California Court reasoned that, 
rather than being an exaction of property,3 the zoning ordinance fell 
within the municipality’s broad discretion to regulate the use of real 
property to serve legitimate interests of the community as a whole.4
Because the California Court decided that the set-aside requirements 
 1. For the purpose of this Note, “inclusionary zoning” will relate to a 
zoning ordinance that features voluntary incentives or mandatory requirements 
aimed at encouraging developers to provide monetary payments or a percentage of 
residential units at a sale price or rent affordable to low-income individuals. See
Marc T. Smith, Charles J. Delaney & Thomas Liou, Inclusionary Housing 
Programs: Issues and Outcomes, 25 REAL EST. L.J. 155, 155 (1996). 
 2. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1006 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016); see also Maura Dolan, Developers 
Can Be Required to Include Affordable Housing, California High Court Rules, L.A.
TIMES (June 15, 2015), http://www.latimes.com/local/lanow/la-me-ln-affordable-
housing-20150615-story.html [https://perma.cc/T27A-JDS5]. 
 3. See id. at 991 (“[S]uch a requirement does not constitute an exaction for 
purposes of the Nollan/Dolan line of decisions and does not trigger application of 
the unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”). 
 4. See id. (reasoning that the ordinance was not an exaction, but that it was 
an exercise of the general, broad discretion to regulate property in order “to serve 
the legitimate interests of the general public and the community at large”). 
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were not exactions5 for the purpose of the Takings Clause, it did not 
subject the ordinance to the established just-compensation analysis 
provided in cases like Nollan v. California Coastal Commission6 and 
Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Management District.7 Instead, the
California Court upheld the inclusionary zoning set-asides.8
On August 27, 2015, the Home Builders Association of Greater 
Chicago (HBAGC) filed a lawsuit in Cook County Circuit Court that 
challenged the constitutionality of the City of Chicago’s inclusionary 
zoning program.9 The HBAGC lawsuit brings into question the 
constitutionality of the Chicago Affordable Requirements 
Ordinance.10 However, the lawsuit also raises questions regarding the 
program’s effectiveness.11 California’s ruling in California Building 
Industry AssҲn was driven by the state’s widespread adoption of 
inclusionary zoning programs in response to affordable housing 
shortages.12 In contrast, the state of Illinois and the City of Chicago 
face a different scenario because the Midwest has not been a test 
market for inclusionary zoning.13 As a result, the HBAGC lawsuit 
 5. See Ronald H. Rosenberg, The Changing Culture of American Land 
Use Regulation: Paying for Growth with Impact Fees, 59 SMU L. REV. 177, 181 
(2006) (defining “exactions” as conditions to land use approval that may often 
demand that a developer make on-site and off-site improvements, land dedications, 
or monetary payments to a municipality). 
 6. 483 U.S. 825, 834, 835 (1987). 
 7. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2597 (2013). 
 8. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 996 (holding that conditioning 
the grant of a building permit upon a developer’s agreement to offer for sale 15 
percent of its on-site units at affordable prices was not an exaction for purposes of 
the Takings Clause). 
 9. See Ryan Ori, Home Builders Sue to Overturn Chicago Affordable 
Housing Ordinance, CRAIN’S CHI. BUS. (Aug. 27, 2015), http://www. 
chicagobusiness.com/realestate/20150827/CRED03/150829844/home-builders-sue-to-
overturn-chicago-affordable-housing-ordinance [https://perma.cc/GRN8-W4SA]. 
 10. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment at 1, Home Builders Ass’n of 
Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015). 
 11. See id. at 7 (arguing that new development does not increase the need 
for or decrease the supply of affordable housing, which consequently means the 
ordinance has no proportionality to new development). 
 12. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 978. 
 13. See Benjamin Powell & Edward Stringham, “The Economics of 
Inclusionary Zoning Reclaimed”: How Effective Are Price Controls?, 33 FLA. ST. U.
L. REV. 471, 472 (2005) (explaining that the areas with the worst affordability 
problems are typically clustered on the East and West coasts; specifically with 
twenty of the twenty-five of the least affordable metropolitan areas located in 
California).
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against the City of Chicago faces a battle similar to that in California 
Home Builders AssҲn.14
The combination of a deregulated land market and a system of 
flat regulatory taxation provides an alternative solution to 
municipality-instituted inclusionary zoning programs.15 If the goal of 
the City of Chicago is to create new affordable housing, then it must 
eliminate mandatory set-aside requirements that are subject to costly 
constitutional takings challenges.16 Instead, the City could meet its 
goal by relying on the in-lieu fees that have already generated $53 
million toward the construction of affordable units.17
Part I of this Note discusses the development of the practice of 
inclusionary zoning by examining its history, purposes, and the 
diverging viewpoints on its effectiveness. Part II discusses the City 
of Chicago’s Affordable Requirements Ordinance (ARO) and the 
changes that the City made applicable in October 2015. Finally, Part 
III analyzes whether the Chicago ARO is effective in comparison to 
a deregulated land market and flat regulatory tax. Part III traces 
inclusionary zoning’s marginal successes in Chicago and examines 
the potential for growth and socio-economic diversity stemming 
from revenue generated by taxes and relaxed zoning restrictions. By 
examining the potential for concurrent economic growth and 
diversity, this Note demonstrates that mandatory, developer-
constructed affordable housing is not a solution to Chicago’s 
affordable housing shortage.  
I. INCLUSIONARY ZONING AS A TOOL FOR PROMOTING AFFORDABLE 
HOUSING
Inclusionary zoning is a phrase that relates to a series of zoning 
ordinances featuring incentives or requirements aimed at 
encouraging developers of residential real estate to build affordable 
housing.18 While supporters of inclusionary zoning advocate its 
 14. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 351 P.3d at 991 (reasoning that the 
legitimate interests of the community as a whole were a sufficient basis to uphold 
the inclusionary zoning ordinance). 
 15. See infra Part III. 
 16. See Ori, supra note 9. 
 17. Mary Ellen Podmolik, Aldermen OK Stricter Affordable Housing Law,
CHI. TRIB. (Mar. 18, 2015, 3:17 PM), http://www.chicagotribune.com/business/ct-
housing-law-0319-biz-20150318-story.html (noting the original ordinance passed in 
2003 and updated in 2007 created only 189 on-site units and $53 million in in-lieu 
fees). 
 18. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 155. 
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ability to encourage multiple parties to address the lack of affordable 
housing,19 the practical reality is that inclusionary zoning shifts the 
cost of providing affordable housing from the municipality to private 
developers.20 It is also possible that private developers pass the 
increased cost to consumers, which in turn exacerbates the 
affordability crisis.21 Further, developers challenge the legality of 
inclusionary zoning programs by arguing that the ordinances affect a 
taking without just compensation.22 As a result, in order to avoid 
costly legal challenges and meet the goal of increasing the supply of 
affordable housing, municipalities can abandon mandatory-
construction requirements and adopt programs with incentives or a 
flat tax on development.23
A. Mount Laurel and Inclusionary Zoning as a Solution to 
Exclusionary Zoning  
The beginning of the rise of inclusionary zoning stems from 
two New Jersey Supreme Court cases commonly referred to as 
Mount Laurel I and Mount Laurel II.24 Mount Laurel Township in 
New Jersey was a municipality without zoning regulations aimed at 
creating low-cost or subsidized housing.25 The majority of Mount 
Laurel’s existing residential property was zoned for single-family 
detached dwellings on lots at least 9,375 square feet in size.26 Each of 
Mount Laurel’s single-family homes needed to meet a minimum of 
900 to 1,100 square feet under the regulation.27 For the township’s 
remaining 4,600 undeveloped acres, the zoning ordinance was much 
 19. See Laura M. Padilla, Reflections on Inclusionary Housing and a 
Renewed Look at Its Viability, 23 HOFSTRA L. REV. 539, 564 (1995) (contending that 
inclusionary zoning programs offer “a viable alternative to housing which is 100% 
publicly financed”). 
 20. See Lawrence Berger, Inclusionary Zoning Devices as Takings: The 
Legacy of the Mount Laurel Cases, 70 NEB. L. REV. 186, 204 (1991) (explaining the 
potential political opposition for programs costing local tax money). 
 21. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 572. 
 22. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 977-78 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 23. See infra Subsection I.C.1. 
 24. See Berger, supra note 20, at 188, 197. 
 25. See WILLIAM A. FISCHEL, THE ECONOMICS OF ZONING LAWS: A
PROPERTY RIGHTS APPROACH TO AMERICAN LAND USE CONTROLS 320 (1985). 
 26. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 
I), 336 A.2d 713, 719 (N.J. 1975). 
 27. Id. (“While it only required a minimum floor area of 900 square feet for 
a one-story dwelling, the minimum lot size was 11,000 square feet . . . .”). 
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more stringent.28 In the undeveloped zone, the minimum lot size was 
20,000 square feet, or about one-half acre.29 The minimum house size 
allowed in the undeveloped zone was 1,110 square feet for a one-
story home and 1,300 square feet for a two-story home.30 Further, the 
township did not allow the construction of attached townhouses, 
apartments, or mobile homes anywhere within the township.31 The 
combination of minimum lot and home sizes functioned to 
effectively exclude low-income individuals from living in the 
community,32 as the requirements led to more expensive construction 
and housing.33
Despite the ordinance’s requirements, a group of developers 
sought to work with the municipal administration to utilize a 
regulation technique known as “planned unit development.”34
Through this technique, the developers sought to provide housing to 
a growing community by working with the municipality to pre-plan a 
community with varying density and a mixture of permitted uses.35 In 
effect, the planned-unit development was to create miniature towns 
in previously unused agricultural land adjacent to growing urban 
areas.36 Despite the developer’s goals of creating housing to meet the 
demand of Mount Laurel’s growing population, the units were out of 
reach for low-income individuals.37
 28. Id. at 720 (explaining that the remaining undeveloped land had a 
minimum lot size requirement of 20,000 square feet). 
 29. See id.
 30. See id. at 719-20. 
 31. Id. at 719 (“Attached townhouses, apartments (except on farms for 
agricultural workers) and mobile homes are not allowed anywhere in the township 
under the general ordinance.”). 
 32. See id. (The New Jersey Court noted that the ordinance “while not as 
restrictive as those in many similar municipalities, nonetheless realistically allow 
only homes within the financial reach of persons of at least middle income”). 
 33. See id. at 729; see also id. at 719 (“The result has been quite intensive 
development of these sections, but at a low density. The dwellings are substantial; 
the average value in 1971 was $32,500 and is undoubtedly much higher today.”). 
 34. Id. at 720 (defining planned unit development as a scheme where “type, 
density and placement of land uses and buildings, instead of being detailed and 
confined to specified districts by local legislation in advance, is determined by 
contract, or ‘deal,’ as to each development between the developer and the municipal 
administrative authority”). 
 35. See id. at 720-21 (detailing that the project planned on constructing 
10,000 sale and rental housing units of various types over the course of a period of 
years). 
 36. See id. at 719-20. 
 37. Id. at 721 (“While multi-family housing in the form of rental garden, 
medium rise and high rise apartments and attached townhouses is for the first time 
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While Mount Laurel acknowledged the need for moderate-
income housing, the township responded by approving a resolution 
requiring construction consistent with all zoning, planning, and 
building ordinances.38 Effectively, the township recognized the need 
for affordable housing, but it did not address the costs associated 
with the requirement that housing be constructed as single-family 
homes on 20,000 square foot lots.39 As a result, the New Jersey 
Supreme Court made it clear that municipalities have an obligation 
to craft regulations in a way that makes a wide variety of housing 
options possible.40 New Jersey’s Supreme Court pulled this 
obligation from the language of the state constitution’s guarantee of 
equal protection and substantive due process.41 Therefore, the Court 
imposed on New Jersey municipalities an obligation to provide 
access to “an appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of 
course, low and moderate cost housing.”42 However, in the closing 
lines of Mount Laurel I, the Court made it clear that “[c]ourts do not 
build housing nor do municipalities.”43 Perhaps foreshadowing the 
impact of such language, Justice Pashman’s concurrence argued that 
                                                                                                       
provided for . . . it is not designed to accommodate and is beyond the financial reach 
of low and moderate income families, especially those with young children. The aim 
is quite the contrary; as with single-family homes in the older conventional 
subdivisions, only persons of medium and upper income are sought as residents.”). 
 38. See id. at 722. 
 39. See id.
 40. See id. at 724 (“We conclude that every such municipality must, by its 
land use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate 
variety and choice of housing.”); see also id. at 728 (“It has to follow that, broadly 
speaking, the presumptive obligation arises for each such municipality affirmatively 
to plan and provide, by its land use regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an 
appropriate variety and choice of housing, including, of course, low and moderate 
cost housing, to meet the needs, desires and resources of all categories of people 
who may desire to live within its boundaries.”). 
 41. See id. at 725; see also N.J. CONST. art. I, para. 1 (“All persons are by 
nature free and independent, and have certain natural and unalienable rights, among 
which are those of enjoying and defending life and liberty, of acquiring, possessing, 
and protecting property, and of pursuing and obtaining safety and happiness.”). 
 42. Mount Laurel I, 336 A.2d at 728 (“[T]he presumptive obligation arises 
for each such municipality affirmatively to plan and provide, by its land use 
regulations, the reasonable opportunity for an appropriate variety and choice of 
housing, including of course, low and moderate cost housing, to meet the needs, 
desires and resources of all categories of people who may desire to live within its 
boundaries.”).
 43. Id. at 734 (“That function is performed by private builders, various 
kinds of associations, or, for public housing, by special agencies created for that 
purpose at various levels of government.”). 
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the Court should have gone farther to curb “deeply ingrained” 
exclusionary practices.44
Even though Mount Laurel I ordered the Township to rezone 
and include the requisite low-income housing,45 eight years later in 
Mount Laurel II the New Jersey Supreme Court revisited its original 
decision.46 The Court was forced47 to revisit the issue because 
nothing in New Jersey municipalities changed due to ongoing local 
political opposition.48 The Court in Mount Laurel II held that—at the 
very least—municipalities were required to remove municipally 
created barriers to the construction of lower-income housing.49 After 
requiring that municipalities take affirmative measures to create 
affordable units, the Court retracted some of its rhetoric in Mount 
Laurel I.50 The Court acknowledged that, without inducement, 
private development was not going to solve the problem of 
affordable housing.51 Instead, the Court decided that two types of 
affirmative measures would ensure that developers would not choose 
to build more profitable single-family homes rather than lower-
 44. See id. at 736 (Pashman, J., concurring) (“The fact that the abuses of 
municipal zoning power are now widespread and derive from attitudes and premises 
deeply ingrained in the suburban planning and zoning processes requires that the 
Court . . . lay down broad guidelines for judicial review of municipal zoning 
decisions which implicate these abuses.”). 
 45. See id. at 731-32 (majority opinion).  
 46. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount Laurel 
II), 456 A.2d 390, 409 (N.J. 1983). 
 47. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 410 (“We have learned from 
experience, however, that unless a strong judicial hand is used, Mount Laurel will 
not result in housing, but in paper, process, witnesses, trials and appeals.”); see also 
FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 329. 
 48. See Charles J. Ten Brink, Gayborhoods: Intersections of Land Use 
Regulation, Sexual Minorities, and the Creative Class, 28 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 789, 
806 (2012) (“Finding that the municipalities of New Jersey had done virtually 
nothing in the interim, it legislated a solution from the bench, in effect establishing 
the New Jersey courts as the final authority for zoning decisions.”). 
 49. See Mount Laurel II, 456 A.2d at 441 (holding that municipalities were 
required to remove zoning and subdivision restrictions that are not necessary to 
protect health and safety in an effort to meet the municipality’s fair share 
requirements under New Jersey law). 
 50. See id. at 442 (“It was never intended in Mount Laurel I that this 
awesome constitutional obligation, designed to give the poor a fair chance for 
housing, be satisfied by meaningless amendments to zoning or other ordinances.”). 
 51. See id. (“Satisfaction of the Mount Laurel doctrine cannot depend on 
the inclination of developers to help the poor.”). 
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income housing.52 First, the Court decided that a municipality might 
encourage or require a developer’s use of state or federal housing 
subsidies.53 Second, and more importantly, the Court introduced the 
idea that a municipality might provide incentives or requirements 
that private developers set aside a portion of a development for 
lower-income housing.54 As a result, the Court in Mount Laurel II
laid the foundations of inclusionary zoning by substituting 
exclusionary ordinances with programs aligned with the goals of 
Mount Laurel I.55
1. How Inclusionary Zoning Works 
After the pair of Mount Laurel decisions, municipalities began 
searching for ways to craft zoning ordinances that created a variety 
of housing for individuals across income levels.56 One solution was 
inclusionary zoning.57 Inclusionary zoning is the use of municipal 
zoning ordinances in a way that requires a developer of a new or 
renovated housing development to set aside a certain fraction of units 
for occupancy by individuals of moderate or low income.58 Under an 
inclusionary zoning program, potential purchasers or renters of these 
units must qualify by meeting an appropriate income level detailed in 
the municipal ordinance.59 As a result, an inclusionary zoning 
program is a tool that shifts the government’s burden of providing 
 52. See id. at 443 (reasoning that if there is no inducement for a builder to 
build low-income housing if single-family dwellings are more profitable then there 
is nothing that makes Mount Laurel I’s good intentions realistic). 
 53. See id. (determining that one affirmative measure for making affordable 
housing realistic would be to encourage the use of available state or federal housing 
subsidies). 
 54. See id. (explaining that in order to make the opportunity for lower-
income housing more realistic, a municipality could “provid[e] incentives for or 
requir[e] private developers to set aside a portion of their developments for lower 
income housing”). 
 55. See id. at 444 (“We do, however, expect municipal officials in 
appropriate cases to do more than pass land use regulations conforming to Mount 
Laurel I. Where appropriate, municipalities should provide a realistic opportunity 
for housing through other municipal action inextricably related to land use 
regulations.”). 
 56. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 327-28 (explaining that inclusionary 
zoning is one device the municipalities developed in order to comply with decisions 
like Mount Laurel).
 57. See id.
 58. See Robert C. Ellickson, The Irony of Inclusionary Zoning, 54 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1167, 1169 (1981). 
 59. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 556. 
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affordable housing to private developers.60 In municipalities with 
inclusionary zoning programs, private developers must meet 
requirements contained in the ordinance as a cost of doing business.61
Most often, municipal ordinances with inclusionary zoning 
programs operate a system combining set-aside requirements and 
taxes or fees.62 Set-aside requirements compel a developer of 
residential property to set aside a set percentage of units in a 
development at a sale price63 or rental rate that is affordable to low- 
or moderate-income households.64 The eventual owner or tenant of a 
unit created through inclusionary zoning programs is typically not 
allowed to resell the unit without living there for a specified period 
of time.65 Instead, an ordinance will contain a provision that allows 
the owner to recover the cost of improvements and an increase 
consistent with inflation.66 In addition to set-aside requirements, 
inclusionary zoning programs may include an ordinance concerning 
tax incentives and development fees.67
Each inclusionary zoning program can be characterized as one 
of two types: mandatory set-asides or voluntary development 
incentives.68 Mandatory set-asides require a private developer to 
provide a fixed percentage of affordable units either with or without 
 60. Id. at 568 (“Inclusionary housing is one solution which shifts the burden 
of providing affordable housing from federal and state government to local 
governments and developers. In addition, it has the potential of providing a wider 
base of support for affordable housing by forcing private developers, public 
agencies, and non-profit entities, among others, to work together.”). 
 61. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 328. 
 62. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 553 (explaining that there are typically 
multiple ways a developer is able to satisfy an inclusionary requirement, such as 
constructing the required units or paying a fee directly to the municipal 
government).
 63. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 13, at 474-75 (explaining that 
while ordinances vary, such a regulation typically requires a certain percentage of 
units to be affordable to low-income families earning anywhere from 51%-80% of 
the median income). 
 64. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 155. 
 65. See Berger, supra note 20, at 206 (“If dwellings were sold to individuals 
at below-market prices in such a way that they were free to resell the unit at market, 
they would get an undeserved windfall gain and the unit would no longer be 
available to lower income families.”). 
 66. See id. (“The typical resale control allows the owner to recoup the 
original cost, plus cost of improvements, plus an increase represented by the 
percentage which the Consumer Price Index or other inflation measure has grown 
since purchase.”). 
 67. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 552-53. 
 68. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 155. 
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some form of “compensation” from the municipality.69 Mandatory 
programs function in a way that the developer’s compliance with the 
set-aside is a condition to the approval of a project during the 
planning stage.70 A common feature of mandatory programs is an in-
lieu fee that a developer may pay the municipality rather than 
construct the unit.71 In-lieu fees provide a measure of leniency to 
developers, but the fees can also function as a tax on new housing 
development.72
In contrast, voluntary inclusionary programs allow a developer 
to set aside a certain number of units in exchange for incentives 
ranging from relaxed density restrictions73 to tax credits and tax- 
exempt bond financing.74 Attaching inclusionary provisions to 
applications for rezoning is a practice that combines both mandatory 
set-aside and voluntary programs.75 Under such programs, a 
municipal agency may expect the developer applying for a permit to 
incorporate plans for affordable housing units in its proposal.76
2. Purposes and Goals of Inclusionary Zoning  
Perhaps the foremost goal of an inclusionary zoning program is 
to promote construction of affordable housing in areas where 
 69. See id. at 156 (explaining that mandatory set-asides require a developer 
to provide affordable units either with or without any compensatory benefits). 
 70. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 552 (explaining that the percentage of 
inclusionary units required depends on various factors including whether the unit 
will be a rental unit or for sale, and whether the unit is intended for very low-, low-, 
or moderate-income households). 
 71. See C. TYLER MULLIGAN & JAMES L. JOYCE, INCLUSIONARY ZONING: A
GUIDE TO ORDINANCES AND THE LAW 71-72 (Sch. of Gov’t at the Univ. of N.C. at 
Chapel Hill ed., 2010) (“Typically, the amount of the payment-in-lieu is calculated 
by reference to the cost to the developer or to the local government to create 
equivalent units, or by reference to the difference in cost between a market-rate unit 
and an affordable unit.”). 
 72. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1188 (“A tax is imposed both when the 
developer pays cash as an in-lieu fee, and when he is forced to provide inclusionary 
units at a financial loss.”). 
 73. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 162 (explaining that 
density bonuses allow more housing units per unit of land, which reduces the land 
and site development costs by spreading costs over more units). 
 74. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 552-53 (describing incentives under 
voluntary programs to be various tools such as subsidies, development fee credits, 
streamlined permit processing, and waiver of leniency in enforcement of 
development standards). 
 75. See MULLIGAN & JOYCE, supra note 71, at 28-29. 
 76. See id. at 29. 
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property prices are so high that lower-income individuals are 
effectively prevented from living there.77 As a result, inclusionary 
zoning is not only the literal opposite of exclusionary zoning,78 but it 
is one solution to ensure that communities promote housing 
construction across a spectrum of income levels.79 Inclusionary 
programs are one way in which municipalities can encourage 
multiple parties ranging from private developers, nonprofit groups, 
and the municipality itself to address the lack of affordable housing.80
Additionally, a side benefit of an inclusionary zoning program 
is that the program can promote a socioeconomic mix of residents in 
select geographic areas.81 While the individual requirements of 
programs vary, a common feature found in inclusionary programs 
requires developers to construct affordable units alongside higher-
priced units.82 The theory underlying a location requirement is that 
inclusion of affordable units in higher-priced neighborhoods will 
distribute the benefits of a given neighborhood across social strata.83
One such benefit is enhanced job accessibility for low-income 
individuals.84 Ideally, an inclusionary zoning plan would allow low-
 77. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 564 (“The biggest strength of inclusionary 
zoning is that it produces sorely needed low- and moderate-income housing.”). 
 78. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1202 (“The fact that inclusionists 
mainly seek to integrate new subdivisions and buildings suggests that they are 
actually motivated by exclusionary purposes.”). 
 79. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 565 (explaining that socio-economic 
integration is a goal of inclusionary zoning programs that has its basis in past court 
decisions) (citing S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel (Mount 
Laurel II), 456 A.2d 390 (N.J. 1983); S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount 
Laurel (Mount Laurel I), 336 A.2d 713 (N.J. 1975)). 
 80. See id. at 568 (“In addition, it has the potential of providing a wider 
base of support for affordable housing by forcing private developers, public 
agencies, and non-profit entities, among others, to work together.”). 
 81. See MULLIGAN & JOYCE, supra note 71, at 1 (“The goal of inclusionary 
zoning is not solely to produce affordable units; inclusionary zoning is undertaken to 
ensure that new residential developments contain housing with an appropriate mix 
of affordability that reflects the income ranges of persons living and working in the 
community.”). 
 82. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 566 (“Most inclusionary housing 
programs require that inclusionary units be dispersed throughout a new 
development, rather than clustered together.”). 
 83. See id. (“If affordable housing is more evenly distributed among market 
priced units, it can give lower economic classes access to better educational 
opportunities, discourage economic segregations, and avoid concentration of 
affordable housing in already blighted sections of cities and counties.”). 
 84. See HERBERT M. FRANKLIN ET AL., IN-ZONING: A GUIDE FOR POLICY-
MAKERS ON INCLUSIONARY LAND USE PROGRAMS 52 (Arthur J. Levin ed., 1974) 
(explaining that one theory behind inclusionary zoning programs is opening up 
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income workers to live closer to jobs in a higher-income 
neighborhood and avoid a costly commute.85 While the overall goals 
of producing affordable housing and diverse communities are 
beneficial and desirable,86 an inclusionary program places burdens on 
development disproportional to its benefits.87
B. Criticisms of Inclusionary Zoning Programs 
Despite the range of goals propounded by inclusionary zoning 
programs, the main underlying goal is the eradication of unfair 
exclusionary zoning practices.88 As municipalities began to create 
inclusionary zoning programs in response to Mount Laurel I and
Mount Laurel II, issues besides exclusionary practices arose.89 First, 
inclusionary zoning programs by their nature shift the cost of 
providing affordable housing to private developers.90 Second, by 
placing the burden on developers, municipalities attempting to create 
affordable housing expose themselves to complex legal challenges.91
As a result, a more effective way to eradicate exclusionary zoning is 
to rid municipal codes of exclusionary language, not create complex 
and burdensome solutions.92
                                                                                                       
housing opportunities so that lower-income workers would be able to gain access to 
the job opportunities provided by the location). 
 85. See id. at 53 (“[T]his reasoning asserts that a recognition of the actual 
needs of business and local government should enter into the planning for future 
growth by assuring that the potential workforce should be able to reach the work 
place conveniently.”). 
 86. See JANE JACOBS, THE DEATH AND LIFE OF GREAT AMERICAN CITIES 14
(Vintage Books 1992) (1961) (“This ubiquitous principle is the need of cities for a 
most intricate and close-grained diversity of uses that give each other constant 
mutual support, both economically and socially.”). 
 87. See generally Ellickson, supra note 58; Berger, supra note 20. 
 88. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 543 (reiterating that while Mount Laurel I 
& II do not guarantee affordable housing, the cases “remove[d] a hurdle by 
providing that municipalities in growth areas have a constitutional obligation to 
provide a realistic opportunity for development of housing for low- and moderate-
income families in their regions through land use regulations”). 
 89. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 328 (explaining inclusionary zoning 
programs have resulted in issues with taxes, legal attacks, and the discouragement of 
overall residential development). 
 90. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1176 (“Under most inclusionary 
ordinances, the costs of inclusion are nominally borne by the developer.”). 
 91. See infra Subsection I.B.2. 
 92. See Powell & Stringham, supra note 13, at 493 (“The one clear policy 
that reverses the effects of exclusionary zoning is the abolition of exclusionary 
ordinances.”). 
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1. Burden on Development and the Housing Market 
Underlying Mount Laurel I’s utilization of using zoning 
ordinances as remedies to provide affordable housing93 is the reality 
that inclusionary zoning programs shift costs from the government to 
private developers.94 Behind the very core of an inclusionary zoning 
program is the desire of a municipality to achieve construction of 
new affordable housing with a minimal burden placed on the 
government.95 Consequently, a developer forced to incur the cost of 
constructing affordable units or paying in-lieu fees may pass the cost 
to owners of undeveloped land or market-rate consumers.96
Essentially, the burden placed on developers by a municipality 
is shifted to the owner of undeveloped land97 or residential 
consumer.98 While affordable units are ultimately created in some 
high-cost areas, such burden shifting raises the overall costs of 
residential housing and exacerbates the overall affordability issue.99
 93. See S. Burlington Cty. NAACP v. Twp. of Mount Laurel, 336 A.2d 
713, 724 (N.J. 1975) (“We conclude that every such municipality must, by its land 
use regulations, presumptively make realistically possible an appropriate variety and 
choice of housing.”). 
 94. See Berger, supra note 20, at 204 (“The use of the mandatory set-aside 
rather than some of the other possible devices is partially explainable by the obvious 
fact that the former does not cost municipalities one red cent of tax money.”). 
 95. See id.
 96. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 572 (arguing the developers can pass costs 
backward to landowners by paying less for land subject to inclusionary regulations 
or pass the costs forward to the market-rate buyer and renters). 
 97. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1206 (“The burdens of inclusionary 
efforts, by contrast, fall largely on potential homebuyers and on owners of 
undeveloped land.”); see also Bernard H. Siegan, Non-Zoning in Houston, 13 J.L. &
ECON. 71, 128 (1970) (“[O]wning land in a zoned community over a period of time 
can be a hazardous investment. . . . [T]he community will make changes in the 
zoning ordinance that the courts are unlikely to upset . . . each of which has an effect 
on value.”). 
 98. See Gerrit-Jan Knaap, Antonio Bento & Scott Lowe, Housing Market 
Impacts of Inclusionary Zoning, NAT’L CTR. FOR SMART GROWTH RESEARCH &
EDUC. 1-2 (Feb. 2008), http://smartgrowth.umd.edu/assets/documents/research/ 
knaapbentolowe_2008.pdf [https://perma.cc/NS56-WJYC]. 
 99. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 160 (explaining that if there is 
not the possibility of substitute housing or the regulations cannot be escaped, a price 
increase may result that affects prices in existing housing markets); see also Scott Beyer, 
Inclusionary Zoning Is Rent Control 2.0, FORBES (May 27, 2015), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottbeyer/2015/05/27/inclusionary-zoning-is-rent-control-
2-0 [https://perma.cc/4GMV-RKJN]; Tom Means & Edward P. Stringham, Unintended 
or Intended Consequences? The Effect of Below-Market Housing Mandates on Housing 
Markets in California, 30 J. PUB. FIN. & PUB. CHOICE 39, 41 (2012) (finding that 
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Not only are newly constructed units inherently more costly, but the 
higher costs of new property also lead owners of existing property to 
raise prices accordingly.100 With fewer newly constructed units 
available to the general public, there is less turnover, which 
exacerbates the shortage of existing housing available at an 
affordable price.101 As a result, the very goal of increasing housing 
affordability for members of the community is hurt by the residual 
rising costs of existing property.102
Depending on the characteristics of the affected community, 
developers may be able to shift to other parties some of the burden of 
construction or paying in-lieu fees.103 Although developers may shift 
the costs to the prior landowner or residential consumer, passing 
costs is only possible in unique markets where strong demand 
exists.104 Only where consumers value attributes of a location such as 
its schools, employment opportunities, and infrastructure, will the 
demand be great enough for developers to increase costs.105 Thus, if 
the community does not have characteristics that are unique and 
desirable, then it will be difficult for developers to recuperate the 
increased costs of new, affordable construction.106
                                                                                                       
California inclusionary programs “between 1990 and 2000, cities that imposed below-
market housing mandates drove up housing prices by 20 percent and ended up with 7 
percent fewer homes”). 
 100. See supra note 97 and accompanying text. 
 101. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 329; Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1185-87 
(introducing the concept of “filtering” as a possible, organic economic solution that 
inclusionary programs ignore and supplant). 
 102. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1203 (discussing the possibility that 
placing the costs on developers will eventually place costs on consumers of both 
new and existing property, which will in turn affect those originally meant to benefit 
from the program). 
 103. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 575 (“[T]he economics of a given housing 
market and the premium attached to certain communities will determine whether, 
and to what extent, a developer can pass inclusionary housing costs on to market 
rate buyers.”). 
 104. See ALAN MALLACH, INCLUSIONARY HOUSING PROGRAMS: POLICIES AND 
PRACTICES 48 (1984). 
 105. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 160 (offering three 
characteristics that shape the elasticity of demand in a particular area: (1) the 
availability of substitute housing, (2) whether a community is unique in its 
attractiveness, and (3) if the community is part of a larger region); see also Andrew 
G. Dietderich, An Egalitarian’s Market: The Economics of Inclusionary Zoning 
Reclaimed, 24 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 23, 77 (1996) (“[W]hen the community has 
special resources, access or charm, the developer will be able to pass on almost the 
entire cost of the inclusionary rules.”). 
 106. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 575. 
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Lastly, the implementation of an inclusionary program can be 
exclusionary in its effect.107 In certain areas where housing prices are 
high, there is the real possibility that high prices reflect an economic 
exclusivity desired by the residents.108 Further, those residents who 
can afford housing in exclusive areas may see the inclusion of 
affordable units as a drawback of new construction.109 Facially, an 
inclusionary program’s only aim is the integration of new
construction, which shows that municipalities create programs that 
protect the interests of current homeowners.110 As a result, residents 
in exclusive areas have the power to influence supply and demand by 
limiting the availability of both new and existing units.111 The only 
possibility for salvaging the original intention of inclusionary 
programs stems from the reality that residents and landowners have 
little political strength in elections.112 Therefore, for inclusionary 
programs to accomplish the goal of socioeconomic integration, a 
requirement that units be constructed within tight geographic 
limitations must exist.113 Without restricting the location of 
affordable units, the developer would be free to place low-income 
units away from exclusive neighborhoods.114
 107. See supra note 99 and accompanying text. 
 108. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 165 (discussing the 
realization that some areas are priced exclusively high because the residents prefer 
living in an area with a homogenous income level). 
 109. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 544-45 (detailing the “Not in My Back 
Yard” (NIMBY) efforts of those in higher-income communities to limit socio-
economic changes). 
 110. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1207 (“The fact that inclusionary 
zoning programs seek to integrate mainly new buildings and subdivisions is a 
persuasive clue that the programs have been framed with the interests of current 
homeowners principally in mind.”). 
 111. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 165 (“The end result is that 
demand for new housing may be choked off, resulting in no new units, either 
market-priced or below-market, being provided.”). 
 112. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1206 (discussing the burdens of 
inclusionary programs fall mostly on owners of undeveloped land because consumer 
groups for residential homeowners are impossible to organize and landowners “have 
little or no voting strength in local elections”). 
 113. See infra Part II (discussing the changes to Chicago’s Affordable 
Housing ordinance including a requirement that affordable units be constructed 
within a certain distance from the new development). 
 114. See FISCHEL, supra note 25, at 328 (“Most inclusionary zoning requires 
that new housing involve closely mixed high- and low-income units. This both 
dampens the demand for high-income units, which is part of the tax on the 
developer, and ensures that low-income units will not be in close proximity to 
existing neighborhoods.”). 
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2. Unconstitutional Takings and Associated Legal Challenges  
Inclusionary zoning first began in 1971 in Fairfax County, 
Virginia115 and the legality of its practices was questioned from the 
beginning.116 The constitutional authorization to enact such zoning 
laws stems from the police power.117 The police power justifies 
government action if the action promotes and preserves public 
health, safety, and welfare.118 However, the power granted to the 
municipality through the state119 is limited by the Fifth Amendment 
of the United States Constitution, which prohibits the taking of 
private property without just compensation.120 The United States 
Supreme Court has not answered the issue of whether mandatory set-
aside requirements or in-lieu fees are constitutionally compensable 
takings of property.121
As a result, a mandatory program requiring a developer to 
surrender ownership of a percentage of affordable units may be a 
taking of property for which the owner must be compensated.122 A 
facial challenge to a regulation challenged as a taking will be 
 115. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1169; see also Smith, Delaney & Liou, 
supra note 1, at 156 (describing an ordinance that required developers of more than 
fifty multi-family units to provide no less than 6% low-income and nine 9% 
moderate-income units). 
 116. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 156 (noting that the Fairfax 
Virginia ordinance was invalidated as a taking of property without just 
compensation in 1973). 
 117. See Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 395 (1926) (“[I]t must 
be said before the ordinance can be declared unconstitutional, that such provisions 
are clearly arbitrary and unreasonable, having no substantial relation to the public 
health, safety, morals, or general welfare.”). 
 118. See id.
 119. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV (“No State shall make or enforce any law 
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws.”). 
 120. U.S. CONST. amend. V (“[N]or shall private property be taken for public 
use, without just compensation.”). 
 121. See Berger, supra note 20, at 188 (discussing the possibility that there is 
a question of the constitutionality of tactics employed by inclusionary programs); 
see also Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1006 (Cal. 2015), 
cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 122. See MULLIGAN & JOYCE, supra note 71, at 28 (“[A] mandatory program 
may be viewed by some as effecting a taking of property for which the owner must 
be compensated. As a matter of law, however, such a finding in court is highly 
unlikely unless a developer is required to surrender ownership of affordable units 
produced.”).
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evaluated according to the test set forth in Penn Central 
Transportation Co. v. New York City.123 A reviewing court must first 
consider the economic impact of the regulation to the extent that it 
interfered with investment-backed expectations.124 The court must 
then consider the character of the regulation in light of its economic 
impact.125 
Penn Central forms the basis of the analysis of a regulatory 
takings challenge, and the Supreme Court has narrowed its focus 
related to land use regulations through subsequent precedent.126 In 
Nollan v. California Coastal Commission, the Court held that there 
must be a nexus between a land-use regulation enacted under the 
police power and the social harm the regulation is designed to 
alleviate.127 In Nollan, the plaintiffs sought to purchase a beachfront 
property a quarter-mile away from a public beach.128 As part of the 
sale of the property, the plaintiffs planned to demolish the existing 
small rental house and replace it with a three-bedroom home similar 
to the surrounding neighborhood.129 In order to obtain a construction 
permit, the plaintiffs submitted an application to the California 
Coastal Commission.130 In response, the Commission stated that the 
permit would be granted subject to the condition that a public 
easement be placed along a portion of the property for access to the 
public beach.131 Essentially, the issue addressed by the Court in 
Nollan was whether the Commission was able to condition the 
building permit on the creation of a public easement to ensure access 
to the public beach.132
 123. See Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of New York, 438 U.S. 104, 124 
(1978) (outlining that the basis for such a challenge is the economic impact of the 
regulation and the extent to which regulation has interfered with investment-backed 
expectations).
 124. See id.
 125. See id. at 124-25. 
 126. See id. at 124; see also, e.g., Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374 
(1994); Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992); see also Nollan v. Cal. 
Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825 (1987). 
 127. 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987) (“[L]and-use regulation does not effect a 
taking if it ‘substantially advance[s] legitimate state interests’ and does not ‘den[y] 
an owner economically viable use of his land.’” (quoting Agins v. City of Tiburon, 
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980))). 
 128. See id. at 827-28. 
 129. See id.
 130. See id. at 828. 
 131. See id.
 132. See id. at 830-31. 
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Before addressing the heart of the issue, the Court in Nollan
made it clear that if the easement for access to the public beach was 
imposed outside the permit process, it would unquestionably be a 
taking.133 In narrowing the scope of a takings challenge, the Court 
reiterated that a regulation is not a taking so long as it “substantially 
advances legitimate state interests.”134 However, subsequent Supreme 
Court precedent has removed the “substantially advances” language 
from a challenge to a zoning ordinance as a taking.135 Rather, the 
Court in Nollan began its takings analysis by considering whether 
the Commission could have denied the building permit independent 
of the zoning ordinance.136 Ultimately, the Court decided that a 
municipality’s regulation of private property must relate to a 
particular objective, not just because an individual is seeking some 
sort of permission from the government.137 In reaching the conclusion 
that the Commission’s condition was a compensable taking, the 
Court announced a two-part framework by which to analyze a 
condition placed on a building permit.138
First, a nexus must exist between a “legitimate state interest” 
and the condition requested by the municipality.139 Second, a 
reviewing court must determine the required degree of connection 
between the condition and the projected impact of the proposed 
 133. See id. at 831 (“Had California simply required the Nollans to make an 
easement across their beachfront available to the public on a permanent basis in 
order to increase public access to the beach, rather than conditioning their permit to 
rebuild their house on their agreeing to do so, we have no doubt there would have 
been a taking.”). 
 134. See id. at 834 (citing Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 
(1980), abrogated by Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005)). 
 135. See Lingle, 544 U.S. at 548 (overruling the substantial evidence test 
promulgated by Agins, 447 U.S. at 260, in favor of language from Nollan and 
Dolan).
 136. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 835 (explaining that the issue in the regulatory 
takings challenge was whether the zoning commission would “unquestionably” be 
able to deny a permit outright outside the challenged ordinance). 
 137. See id. at 841; see also Berger, supra note 20, at 208 (stating that 
Nollan “serves the important function of demanding that governmental 
impingements on private property not be used as a subterfuge to extract from the 
individual some valuable right which the government could not ordinarily take 
without paying compensation for it, just because the individual happens to be 
seeking some permission from the government at the time”). 
 138. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 841, 837. 
 139. See id. at 837 (determining that if “the condition substituted for the 
prohibition utterly fails to further the end advanced as the justification for the 
prohibition” then it is the same as an outright taking of the applicant’s property). 
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development or construction.140 The Court ultimately determined 
that, while the public interest in having access to the public beach 
would be served by an easement across the plaintiff’s property, the 
proposed construction did not cause a lack of access.141 Because the 
proposed construction did not restrict physical access to the public 
beach, the plaintiffs could not be compelled to contribute to the 
Commission’s desire for a public walkway.142 As a result, the Court 
determined a municipality must pay for an exaction rather than place 
a condition on a permit requiring an owner to give a portion of the 
property.143 In conclusion, a municipal zoning ordinance that places a 
condition on building permits must survive the narrow scrutiny of 
Nollan’s two-part analysis.144
Five years later, the Court held in Lucas v. South Carolina 
Coastal Council that a land use regulation is a compensable taking if 
it denies a landowner all economically viable land use.145 If a court 
determines that a landowner retains some value in the land, then the 
court must balance the public and private interest affected by the 
regulation.146 While not meant to be an all-inclusive list, a court 
should consider the degree of harm to public lands and resources, 
adjacent private property, the social value of the claimant’s activities 
and their suitability to the location in question, and the relative ease 
 140. See id. (“In short, unless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid 
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. 
Assocs. v. Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14-15 (N.H. 1981))). 
 141. See id. at 838 (explaining that the Commission attempted to justify the 
condition on the basis that “access” meant that the plaintiffs’ new construction 
would interfere with visual access to the beach, which would in turn create a 
“psychological barrier” to the public beach). 
 142. See id. at 841 (“The Commission may well be right that it is a good 
idea, but that does not establish that the Nollans (and other coastal residents) alone 
can be compelled to contribute to its realization.”). 
 143. See id. at 841-42. 
 144. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 386 (1994) (explaining that a 
reviewing court “must first determine whether the ‘essential nexus’ exists between 
the ‘legitimate state interest’ and the permit condition exacted by the city” before 
examining the degree of connection between the exaction and projected impact of 
the proposed construction (quoting Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837)). 
 145. 505 U.S. 1003, 1019 (1992) (“[W]hen the owner of real property has 
been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the 
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a 
taking.”). 
 146. See id. at 1030. 
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with which the harm can be avoided through action by the claimant 
and the government.147
Building upon the precedent in Nollan and Lucas, the Court 
decided in Dolan v. City of Tigard that a “rough proportionality” test 
was necessary in analyzing the public interest affected by the 
proposed development.148 In Dolan, the plaintiff sought to redevelop 
a lot in the municipality’s central business district on which her 
current business was already located.149 When Dolan applied for a 
permit, the municipality granted the application on the condition that 
she dedicate a portion of her property within a floodplain as part of a 
public greenway and drainage system.150 In addition, the permit was 
conditioned on a fifteen-foot strip of land being dedicated as public 
land for a pedestrian and bicycle pathway.151 After an appeal to the 
municipality’s zoning commission, the Oregon Supreme Court 
ultimately found an essential nexus between the pedestrian pathway, 
the storm drainage dedications, and Dolan’s proposed development 
of the site.152 However, Dolan petitioned the United States Supreme 
Court to clarify Nollan’s required degree of connection between a 
municipality’s exaction and the proposed development’s projected 
impact.153
After reiterating the two-part analysis from Nollan, the Court 
reasoned that the area exacted from a permit applicant must be 
“roughly proportional” to the needs created by the development.154
Through its proportionality test, the Court came to the conclusion 
that a municipality must make an individualized determination that 
 147. See id. at 1030-31 (The Court reasoned that a total takings question 
would ordinarily entail an “analysis of, among other things, the degree of harm to 
public lands and resources, or adjacent private property . . . the social value of the 
claimant’s activities and their suitability to the locality in question . . . and the 
relative ease with which the alleged harm can be avoided through measures taken by 
the claimant and the government”). 
 148. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391. 
 149. See id. at 379. 
 150. See id. at 378-80 (explaining that the municipality had enacted a master 
drainage plan as part of its community development code that suggested the 
floodplain of a local creek be free from structures and remain a green space in order 
to minimize flood damage). 
 151. See id. at 380. 
 152. See id. at 381-83. 
 153. See id. at 377 (“We granted certiorari to resolve a question left open by 
our decision in Nollan v. California Coastal Commission . . . of what is the required 
degree of connection between the exactions imposed by the city and the projected 
impacts of the proposed development.”) (internal citations omitted). 
 154. See id. at 391. 
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the exaction is related both to the nature and extent of the impact of 
the proposed development.155 When applied to Dolan’s case, the 
Court determined that flood prevention and reducing traffic 
congestion by use of pedestrian walkways were legitimate public 
interests under Nollan.156 However, the municipality never made it 
clear why the green space and walkway needed to be set aside as 
public land in order to fulfill its interests.157 Further, the Court 
reasoned that by making the exacted areas public, Dolan would lose 
one of the most fundamental property rights, the right to exclude.158
In deciding in favor of Dolan, the Court found no reasonable 
relationship between the municipality’s needs and the proposed new 
development.159 Despite a municipality’s desire to improve its overall 
condition, the Court reiterated that such a goal could not be attained 
by taking property without compensation.160 Ultimately, while a 
municipality has the power to solve issues related to development, 
the Court restated that the Fifth Amendment limits such power.161
Recently, the Supreme Court in Koontz v. St. John’s River 
Water Management District held that monetary exactions must also 
satisfy the requirements of Nollan and Dolan.162 In Koontz, a 
developer planned to develop a parcel of property composed of 
wetlands regulated by Florida’s Water Resources Act.163 In applying 
for the requisite building permits, the developer offered to preserve 
eleven acres of a 14.9-acre tract in order to mitigate any 
environmental effects development would have on the wetland.164 In 
response, the Water Management District offered two scenarios by 
 155. Id. (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city must 
make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”). 
 156. See id. at 387. 
 157. See id. at 393. 
 158. See id. (“[The] right to exclude others is ‘one of the most essential 
sticks in the bundle of rights that are commonly characterized as property.’” 
(quoting Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164, 176 (1979))). 
 159. See id. at 394-95 (“We conclude that the findings upon which the city 
relies do not show the required reasonable relationship between the floodplain 
easement and the petitioner’s proposed new building.”). 
 160. See id. at 396 (“A strong public desire to improve the public condition 
[will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.” (quoting Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))). 
 161. See id.
 162. 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 (2013) (“[S]o-called ‘monetary exactions’ must 
satisfy the nexus and rough proportionality requirements of Nollan and Dolan.”). 
 163. See id. at 2591-92. 
 164. See id. at 2592. 
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which the developer could receive a permit.165 The developer could 
either develop only one acre and preserve the remaining 13.9 acres, 
or the developer could personally hire contractors to make 
improvements to state-owned land located miles away from the 
property at issue.166 In response to the developer’s appeal, the Florida 
Supreme Court held that a monetary demand does not give rise to a 
claim under Nollan and Dolan.167
To resolve the split among lower courts,168 the Supreme Court 
recognized that placing a condition on a building permit was similar 
to the “unconstitutional conditions doctrine.”169 The Court found that 
Nollan and Dolan were two specific applications of the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine.170 Further, the Court found 
these cases to protect a property owner’s Fifth Amendment right to 
just compensation for property taken while applying for a land-use 
permit.171 The Court reasoned that owners applying for land-use 
permits are especially vulnerable to the coercion that the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is meant to prevent because the 
municipality enjoys broad discretion in denying a permit.172 Because 
the building permit is likely to be worth far more to the developer 
than the property the municipality offers to take, the Court found an 
inherently high level of coercion.173 As a result, the Court reasoned 
that certain conditions would allow a municipality to escape Nollan
and Dolan by simply phrasing the demand for property as a 
condition to permit approval.174 In refusing to grant such power to 
 165. See id. at 2593. 
 166. See id.
 167. See id.
 168. See id. at 2594 (“The majority acknowledged a division of authority 
over whether a demand for money can give rise to a claim under Nollan and Dolan,
and sided with those courts that have said it cannot.”). 
 169. See id. (explaining that the unconstitutional-conditions doctrine 
“vindicates the Constitution’s enumerated rights by preventing the government from 
coercing people into giving them up”). 
 170. See id. (citing Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 547 
(2005)).
 171. See id.
 172. See id.
 173. See id. (“By conditioning a building permit on the owner’s deeding over 
a public right-of-way, for example, the government can pressure an owner into 
voluntary giving up property for which the Fifth Amendment would otherwise 
require just compensation.”). 
 174. See id. at 2595 (“[I]t would enable the government to evade the 
limitations of Nollan and Dolan simply by phrasing its demands for property as 
conditions precedent to permit approval.”). 
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conditions placed on building permits, the Court extended the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine so that a municipality is unable 
to use land-use permitting as a means of taking property without 
compensation.175
However, the Court did not completely bar a municipality’s 
ability to attach conditions to the issuance of a building permit.176 So 
long as a municipality offers one alternative scenario complying with 
Nollan and Dolan, there is no infringement of the developer’s right 
to receive just compensation for the property to be exacted.177
Further, the Court recognized that such a valid alternative scenario 
might include a monetary payment.178 By contrasting the options to 
surrender physical property with paying an amount equal to the 
exaction’s value, the Court upheld monetary exactions as an 
equivalent to other forms of land-use exactions.179 Despite the 
constitutionality of monetary exactions, the Court made it clear that 
such a condition must still meet the Nollan and Dolan
requirements.180 Thus, the Court’s interpretation of Nollan and Dolan
in Koontz left open the question of whether a municipality can 
impose inclusionary zoning conditions on a developer before 
securing a building permit.181
 175. See id. at 2596 (“Extortionate demands for property in the land-use 
permitting context run afoul of the Takings Clause not because they take property 
but because they impermissibly burden the right not to have property taken without 
just compensation.”). 
 176. See id. at 2598 (clarifying that a condition may be constitutional so long 
as there is at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan).
 177. See id. 
 178. See id. at 2599 (holding that “‘monetary exactions’ must satisfy the 
nexus and rough proportionality requirements”). 
 179. See id. (“Because the government need only provide a permit applicant 
with one alternative that satisfies the nexus and rough proportionality standards, a 
permitting authority wishing to exact an easement could simply give the owner a 
choice of either surrendering an easement or making a payment equal to the 
easement’s value.”). 
 180. See id. at 2600 (deciding that the specific facts of the case constituted a 
per se taking of the developer’s property similar to a standard easement because 
paying for improvement to state-owned land would simply be a transfer of monetary 
property without any connection to the plans the developer has for its property). 
 181. See Carol M. Rose, Property Rights, Regulatory Regimes and the New 
Takings Jurisprudence – An Evolutionary Approach, 57 TENN. L. REV. 577, 579 
(1990) (explaining that the language of Nollan “might be read as a use of takings 
doctrine to restrain any land use regulation, whether physically invasive or not, from 
imposing conditions on development that are unrelated to problems that the 
development itself creates”). 
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C. Inclusionary Zoning and Takings Challenges  
One court that has addressed the vagueness of Nollan and 
Dolan in relation to inclusionary zoning is the California Supreme 
Court.182 California Building Industry AssҲn v. City of San Jose was 
decided on June 15, 2015, and the California Court held that a 
regulation requiring a developer to sell 15% of its on-site units at a 
reduced cost was not a taking.183 The California Court dismissed the 
argument that the inclusionary ordinance was valid only if it was 
reasonably related to a proposed new development’s adverse impact 
on the city’s affordable housing problem.184 Similarly, on August 27, 
2015, the Home Builders Association of Greater Chicago filed a 
lawsuit against the City of Chicago.185 The Chicago suit alleges that 
the City’s Affordable Requirements Ordinance amounts to a 
regulatory taking of private property without just compensation.186
The pending Chicago lawsuit is another case demonstrating that 
inclusionary zoning programs are susceptible to costly legal 
challenges.187
1. A Challenge to Chicago’s Affordable Requirements 
Ordinance 
The basis of the challenge in Chicago is that the Takings 
Clause of the Fifth Amendment exists to prevent the government 
from forcing one party to bear a burden that should be “borne by the 
public as a whole.”188 In particular, a developer is challenging an 
inclusionary zoning ordinance, the Affordable Requirements 
Ordinance (ARO), which requires developers to sell or rent a 
 182. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 989-90 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 183. Id. at 991 (“Rather than being an exaction, the ordinance falls within 
what we have already described as municipalities’ general broad discretion to 
regulate the use of real property to serve the legitimate interests of the general public 
and the community at large.”). 
 184. Id. at 978-79. 
 185. Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Home Builders Ass’n of Greater 
Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015). 
 186. See id.
 187. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 188. See Plaintiffs’ Response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 
1, Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 3, 2015) (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 384 (1994) (quoting 
Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960))). 
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percentage of residential units at an “affordable price” determined by 
the city.189 Alternatively, under the 2007 version of the ordinance, 
developers could pay the city a $100,000 fee per unit.190 Either of the 
two requirements applies when a developer seeks to receive certain 
zoning changes from the city.191 Essentially, the requirements to 
construct a percentage of affordable units or pay the in-lieu fees are 
conditions precedent to a developer securing a building permit and a 
change in the location’s zoning.192
After paying in-lieu fees totaling $200,000 in order to secure a 
building permit and a change in zoning, the developer challenged the 
ARO on the basis that it constituted an unconstitutional taking.193 The 
developer argued that, even if the City enacted the ARO because of 
the strong public need for more affordable housing, the City could 
not meet its goal by taking property without paying for it.194 In 
response, the City argued that the ordinance did not amount to a 
taking of the developer’s property because the ordinance only 
imposed restrictions on how a property is used, which does not 
trigger the takings tests.195 Instead, the City argued that it did not 
restrict a right held by the developer because the developer never 
possessed the right to build a large residential structure on a lot 
zoned for commercial use.196 As a result, the City’s defense centered 
on Yee v. City of Escondido, which held that a municipality can 
regulate the use of property to the extent that the owner is not singled 
 189. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 110 (2007), http://library.amlegal. 
com/nxt/gateway.dll/Illinois/chicago_il/municipalcodeofchicago?f=templates$fn=default
.htm$3.0$vid=amlegal:chicago_il [https://perma.cc/38PF-6WPS]. 
 190. See id. 
 191. See id. 
 192. See id. (explaining that the Affordable Requirements Ordinance applies 
to a property owner developing a residential housing project when the city 
“(i) approves the rezoning of a lot to permit a higher floor area ratio . . . ; (ii) 
approves the rezoning of a lot from a zoning district that does not allow household 
living . . . ; [or] (iii) approves the rezoning of a lot from a zoning district that does 
not allow household living uses on the ground floor”). 
 193. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion Dismiss, supra
note 188, at 1. 
 194. See id. (“Even if the City had established a strong public need for more 
affordable housing, ‘[a] strong public desire to improve the public condition [will 
not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.’” (quoting Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 
(1994))).
 195. See City’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint at 2, Home Builders 
Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2015).  
 196. See id. 
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out to bear a burden that should belong to the public as a whole.197
Under this line of reasoning, the City would be free to regulate the 
maximum rent charged once the developer completed the project.198
Further, under state court precedent like California Building Industry 
AssҲn v. City of San Jose, regulation may not amount to a taking if a 
developer is required to sell units at a predetermined, affordable 
price.199 However, the United States Supreme Court has yet to 
address the issue of whether mandatory set-aside requirements 
amount to an unconstitutional taking.200 As a result, to avoid costly 
legal challenges and still meet the goal of expanding the inventory of 
affordable housing, municipalities must utilize incentives and novel 
planning techniques.201
2. Avoiding Takings Challenges 
At the base of the issue, municipalities seeking to avoid takings 
challenges must provide developers with a form of compensation in 
exchange for the required affordable units.202 In order to survive a 
takings challenge, a municipality must provide a developer with a 
form of compensation allowing a project to break even rather than 
lose money.203 However, reaching an agreeable form of nonmonetary 
compensation equal to a developer’s possible financial loss is 
difficult because it relies on each site’s unique development plan and 
 197. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 522-23 (1992) (“[W]here 
the government merely regulates the use of property, compensation is required only 
if considerations such as the purpose of the regulation or the extent to which it 
deprives the owner of the economic use of the property suggest that the regulation 
has unfairly singled out the property owner to bear a burden that should be borne by 
the public as a whole.”). 
 198. See City’s Memorandum in Support of Its Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s 
Complaint at 7, Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-
8268 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2015). 
 199. See id. at 8. 
 200. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1006 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 201. See infra Subsection I.C.2. 
 202. See Padilla, supra note 19, at 589 (explaining that regulatory takings 
may be upheld “so long as the particular challenged program provided adequate 
incentives to allow a developer to earn reasonable profits”). 
 203. See id. at 598-99 (predicting that a regulatory takings challenge may be 
successful if a developer cannot break even, or even loses money, even though the 
balancing tests weigh in favor of the public interest served by an inclusionary 
program).
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location.204 As a result, a municipality can work traditional zoning 
incentives such as density bonuses into an inclusionary zoning 
program in order to provide compensation.205 Alternatively, 
removing a mandatory set-aside provision and replacing it with in-
lieu fees or construction taxes may provide a municipality with a 
stronger position if faced with a takings challenge.206 Since Nollan
and Dolan only require that a municipality provide one alternative 
that meets the “nexus and rough proportionality standards,” 
monetary payments provide a stable source of income to meet 
affordable housing goals.207
One form of compensation offered in exchange for the use of 
developer resources is a density bonus.208 A density bonus allows a 
developer to provide more residential units per square foot than 
typically allowed under a particular zone’s requirements.209
Theoretically, a density bonus would allow a developer to build more 
units on a particular lot, which would in turn increase revenue.210
Any costs associated with an inclusionary zoning ordinance would 
be recuperated by the increase in sale price or rent from additional 
units.211 However, relying on density bonuses as a form of 
compensation requires that a municipality and its planner have 
extensive knowledge of the developer’s plan and economic 
 204. See id. at 598 (“[Financial impact] is hard to measure in the abstract 
without knowing the specific details of an ordinance and the actual financial impact 
on a development project.”). 
 205. Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1180 (“By coupling a density bonus to its 
inclusionary requirements, a government can reduce the construction industry’s 
political opposition to the inclusionary program, and can help rebut a developer’s 
contention that an inclusionary requirement is an unconstitutional taking of 
property.”). 
 206. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2599 
(2013) (reasoning that in-lieu fees are “utterly commonplace” and function as an 
alternative to a developer turning over physical possession of a portion of property). 
 207. See id.; see also Rosenberg, supra note 5, at 182 (describing the 
increasing commonality of local municipalities requiring builders, landowners, land 
developers, and consumers to pay “development cash impact fees” to fund public 
programs necessary because of new construction). 
 208. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1180. 
 209. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 162. 
 210. See id.
 211. See MARYA MORRIS, INCENTIVE ZONING: MEETING URBAN DESIGN AND 
AFFORDABLE HOUSING OBJECTIVES 12 (2000) (describing a return-on-investment 
approach to incentives that assumes planners administering bonuses will “calibrate 
the bonus so that return on investment is higher than it would be otherwise, or, at a 
minimum, that the return on investment is the same as it would be without the bonus 
system”). 
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projections, which may not be readily available during the permitting 
process.212
While not a form of compensation, construction taxes passed 
by a legislative body and enforced by the municipality’s zoning 
commission as a condition to securing a building permit would 
circumvent a takings challenge altogether.213 A major hurdle to 
regulatory taxes is that a tax needs to be passed by the legislature, 
not the body enforcing the ordinance.214 Further, if challenged in 
court as an unconstitutional taking, the taxes and fees must meet the 
standards provided in Nollan and Dolan.215 As a result, the payments 
must be reasonable in relation to a problem caused by the 
development.216 Despite the challenges of implementing fee 
structures and taxation schemes, if done correctly, monetary 
payments from developers could be amassed in a fund for affordable 
housing.217 Such a fund would provide a municipality with the 
capacity to purchase, construct, and rent affordable units in any 
neighborhood with available property.218
 212. See id. (explaining that using the density bonus model requires 
economic projections to be made well in advance of actual construction). 
 213. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2601 
(2013) (stating that the United States Supreme Court has “repeatedly found takings 
where the government, by confiscating financial obligations, achieved a result that 
could have been obtained by imposing a tax”); see also Brown v. Legal Found. of 
Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 232 (2003) (reasoning that a state’s seizure of interest on 
client funds held in escrow was a taking that could have been avoided had the state 
imposed a special tax that would have raised the very same revenue). 
 214. See William W. Merrill III & Robert K. Lincoln, Linkage Fees and Fair 
Share Regulations: Law and Method, 25 URB. LAW. 223, 225-26 (1993) (explaining 
that local government must have the authority under state law to adopt taxes tied to 
an affordable housing program). 
 215. See id. at 282. 
 216. See San Remo Hotel L.P. v. City & Cty. of San Francisco, 41 P.3d 87, 
107 (Cal. 2002) (reasoning that changing a building from low-income residential to 
a hotel resulted in a loss of housing, which in turn justified the imposition of 
monetary fees). 
 217. See Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1183 (describing the use of funds in 
order to finance affordable housing in the same neighborhood from which the fee 
was derived). 
 218. See id.
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3. The Free Land Market and New Urbanism 
For decades, private developers have shouldered cost increases 
necessary to comply with zoning restrictions.219 A 2001 survey 
conducted by the Urban Land Institute asked developers about the 
impact of zoning on their ability to construct high-density residential 
properties.220 The study found that 85.4% of private developers 
surveyed agreed that the supply of dense urban developments was 
inadequate to meet demand.221 Additionally, 78.2% of those same 
developers cited government regulation as a barrier to urban 
development.222 As the survey shows, developers of urban land must 
continually stay on top of land-use restrictions governing new 
residential development projects.223
One of the most common examples of a municipality with 
deregulated zoning restrictions is Houston, Texas.224 In the absence 
of formal zoning restrictions, Houston’s housing market has kept up 
with demand for affordable housing because restrictive regulations 
have been removed.225 The relative success of a city like Houston 
demonstrates that, without government intervention, the market itself 
will compel development of affordable units.226
 219. See Robert C. Ellickson, Alternatives to Zoning: Covenants, Nuisance 
Rules, and Fines as Land Use Controls, 40 U. CHI. L. REV. 681, 682 (1973) 
[hereinafter Alternatives to Zoning] (“Land development in urban areas is one of the 
most regulated human activities in the United States . . . public regulation of urban 
land has increased sharply in incidence and severity, but dissatisfaction with the 
physical appearance and living arrangements in American cities continues to 
grow.”).
 220. See Michael Lewyn, New Urbanist Zoning for Dummies, 58 ALA. L.
REV. 257, 263-64 (2006) (describing the Urban Land Institute and the impacts of its 
survey). 
 221. See id. at 263. 
 222. See id. 
 223. See Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 219, at 697-98 (“The existence 
of zoning means that builders, land speculators, civil engineers, architects, financial 
institutions, lawyers, and others involved in land development must maintain 
libraries of local land use regulations and spend time studying them.”). 
 224. See Siegan, supra note 97, at 128 (describing Houston’s lack of zoning 
regulations and the growth the city has sustained in the absence). 
 225. See id. (emphasizing the possibility that tenants of Houston, a city with 
no zoning regulations, have been able to afford new apartments that might have been 
otherwise unaffordable if Houston had been zoned in a traditional manner). 
 226. See id.
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Additionally, a concept derived from New Urbanism227 called 
Traditional Neighborhood Developments (TNDs) provides an 
example of how relaxing traditional zoning restrictions might 
promote the same socioeconomic diversity desired by inclusionary 
zoning programs.228 New Urbanism is a planning philosophy that 
seeks to promote diversity in urban settings through orderly systems 
that do not affect the freedom to develop.229 TNDs are urban 
neighborhoods with walkable streets that contain housing within 
walking distance of schools, workplaces, and shopping.230 However, 
to create TNDs, much of the current zoning ordinances valuing space 
and separation of uses would need to be removed or amended.231
While traditional zoning requirements regulate the location, size, and 
aesthetic of a building, New Urbanist ideals require heightened 
levels of density that drive the creation of mixed-income 
neighborhoods containing essential amenities within a walkable 
distance.232
By removing restrictions on land-use types and density of 
urban areas, New Urbanist ideals create property that is cheaper to 
develop because a developer is free to build more with less space.233
Nevertheless, deregulating land-use and zoning programs is not free 
from challenges, as a major criticism of deregulation is that cities 
will revert to the slum-like conditions that active zoning regulation 
was originally intended to correct.234 Despite fears that urban areas 
will return to the decaying and unsanitary American cities that 
exploded while the country industrialized, modern zoning ordinances 
favoring separation of uses, single-family lots, and set-backs have 
 227. New Urbanism is a planning theory focused on neighborhoods, rather 
than housing tracts, as the basic structure of a city or town. See JONATHAN BARNETT, 
Introduction: New Urbanism and Codes, in CODIFYING NEW URBANISM: HOW TO 
REFORM MUNICIPAL LAND DEVELOPMENT REGULATIONS 5 (2004).
 228. See Lewyn, supra note 220, at 259. 
 229. See EMILY TALEN, NEW URBANISM & AMERICAN PLANNING: THE
CONFLICT OF CULTURES 1 (2005) (describing New Urbanism’s attempt to combine 
traditions of planning to create complex and comprehensive urban environments). 
 230. See Lewyn, supra note 220, at 259. 
 231. See JOEL RUSSELL, New Urbanist Essentials, in CODIFYING NEW 
URBANISM, supra note 227, at 12.
 232. See id. at 12-13 (“This emphasis on walkability should inform many 
parts of the ordinance, from mixed-use zones to residential densities to standards for 
maximum block size, street width, and street connectivity.”). 
 233. See Lewyn, supra note 220, at 259-60. 
 234. See Jane E. Larson, Free Markets Deep in the Heart of Texas, 84 GEO.
L.J. 179, 235 (1995). 
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added nothing to ease housing prices.235 Property development 
continues to be expensive.236
Altogether, while the goal of inclusionary zoning programs is 
to provide an increase in the number of affordable units, a burden is 
placed on property developers and the market.237 Despite the goal of 
inclusionary programs, certain zoning components raise complex 
issues as to whether the programs effectuate an unconstitutional 
taking.238 However, alternatives to mandatory set-aside programs 
exist, which may survive a regulatory takings challenge.239
Nevertheless, municipalities like the city of Chicago have increased 
efforts to provide affordable housing through the use of mandatory 
set-aside provisions.240
II. CHICAGO’S AFFORDABLE REQUIREMENTS ORDINANCE
In 2003, Chicago passed the original iteration of its Affordable 
Requirements Ordinance, which was later amended in 2007.241 Since 
the ARO was created, it has spurred developers to create only 189 
on-site units, which equates to about sixteen units per year.242
However, in the same time span, the ARO has generated $53 million 
in in-lieu fees paid to the Chicago Housing Authority.243 According 
to the Housing Authority, Chicago used the fees both as rent 
subsidies and capital to underwrite the construction of 2,500 
apartment units.244
On March 18, 2015, the Chicago City Council passed245
changes to the ARO with overwhelming support.246 Chicago passed 
 235. See Lewyn, supra note 220, at 277-78. 
 236. See id. 
 237. See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 238. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 239. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 240. See infra Part II. 
 241. See Harold S. Dembo & Kristin A. Nordman, New Chicago Affordable 
Housing Ordinance Means Greater Costs for Developers, NAT’L L. REV. (May 21, 
2015), http://www.natlawreview.com/article/new-chicago-affordable-housing-ordinance-
means-greater-costs-developers [https://perma.cc/56E3-D958]. 
 242. See Podmolik, supra note 17. 
 243. See id. 
 244. See id. (“The fees were used, in the form of rent subsidies, to help 
underwrite 2,500 apartment units, according to the city.”). 
 245. See Fran Spielman, City Council Approves Affordable-Housing 
Ordinance, CHI. SUN TIMES (Mar. 18, 2015, 5:17 PM), http://chicago.suntimes. 
com/chicago-politics/7/71/452041/city-council-approves-affordable-housing-ordinance 
[https://perma.cc/D2DL-LRJV]. 
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the 2015 changes in response to a report prepared by the 
Commissioner of the Department of Planning & Development at 
Mayor Rahm Emanuel’s request.247 Chicago’s housing supply 
suffered a large amount of pressure that crested in 2008 after 
foreclosures drove down home values and halted market-rate 
construction.248 While the overall housing market in Chicago has 
started to emerge from this slump, the growth has been localized to 
downtown areas like the Loop and a handful of North Side 
neighborhoods.249
The Institute for Housing Studies at DePaul University250 found 
that from 2010 to 2014, the projected average residential 
construction rate for the City of Chicago would be about 1,800 units 
per year.251 However, the study concluded that most units would be 
set at prices affordable only to middle- and upper-income 
residents.252 Further stressing the need for the construction of 
affordable units, Chicago’s Five-Year Housing Plan included data 
from the American Community Survey.253 The data showed that 
demand for affordable units exceeded supply by about 118,000 
households in 2011.254 One tool proposed in the Five-Year Housing 
Plan was a change to the ARO, so that Chicago might generate 
affordable units within the market-rate developments appearing 
downtown and on the North Side.255 Chicago’s Five-Year Housing 
                                                                                                       
 246. See Podmolik, supra note 17 (noting that no Chicago aldermen opposed 
the measure). 
 247. See Rahm Emanuel & Andrew J. Mooney, Bouncing Back: Five-Year 
Housing Plan 2014-2018, CITY OF CHI. DEP’T OF PLANNING & DEV. (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/general/housing/Chicago_
Housing_Plan_Web_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/2S2Q-Q5D4]. 
 248. See id. § 1. 
 249. See id.
 250. Inst. for Hous. Studies, Overview of the Chicago Housing Market: 
Background Data for Chicago’s 2014-2018 Housing Plan, DEPAUL UNIV. (2013), 
https://www.housingstudies.org/media/filer_public/2013/10/01/ihs_2013_overview_
of_chicago_housing_market.pdf [https://perma.cc/22JY-FUWQ]. 
 251. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247, § 4 (“In the central city, new 
rental production from 2010 to 2014 is expected to average about 1,800 units per 
year, mostly at prices affordable only to middle- and upper-income tenants.”). 
 252. See id.
 253. See id. 
 254. See id. (“[V]ery little new rental housing is being built, even though 
demand for affordable units exceeded supply by about 118,000 households in 2011, 
according to American Community Survey data.”). 
 255. See id. § 2.7 (“[S]ome active programs might be revised to better target 
scarce resources.”). 
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Plan concluded that revising the ARO would help “the City create 
and sustain mixed-income communities.”256
The Chicago City Council decided that changes to the ARO 
would take effect in October 2015.257 The City Council delayed the 
measures for 180 days because developers warned that the changes 
would adversely affect construction if new, stiff fees were 
imposed.258 As a result, Chicago created a system of graduated fee 
increases that will not go into full effect for at least an entire year.259
A. Development Projects Subject to the ARO 
In its most basic form, the Chicago ARO applies to residential 
development projects containing ten or more residential units plus at 
least one other requirement.260 The ARO applies to a residential 
development project if it is a new construction, “substantial 
rehabilitation,”261 or conversion of a rental unit to a condominium.262
To ensure compliance, the City does not issue a building permit for a 
project until the developer meets the ARO’s requirements.263
Additional instances where the ARO would apply are 
development projects receiving either a change in zoning that 
permits a higher floor-area ratio,264 a change from nonresidential to 
 256. See id. (“The Affordable Requirements Ordinance, which could be 
refined to generate more affordable units in market-rate developments, helping the 
City create and sustain mixed-income communities.”). 
 257. See Podmolik, supra note 17. 
 258. See id.
 259. See id. 
 260. See Dembo & Nordman, supra note 241; CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-
45, § 115(B) (2015) (“‘Residential housing project’ means one or more buildings 
that collectively contain ten or more new or additional housing units on one or more 
parcels or lots under common ownership or control, including contiguous parcels.”). 
 261. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(B) (2015) (“‘Substantial 
rehabilitation’ means the reconstruction, enlargement, installation, repair, alteration, 
improvement or renovation of a building, structure or portion thereof requiring a 
permit issued by the city, provided the cost of the substantial rehabilitation must be 
$75,000 or more per housing unit.”). 
 262. See id. (“A ‘residential housing project’ may be developed in one or 
more phases and may consist of new construction, substantial rehabilitation, or the 
conversion of rental housing to condominiums.”). 
 263. See id. § 115(K) (requiring that a builder pay an amount equal to the in-
lieu fees or execute an affordable housing agreement before securing a building 
permit for a residential project subject to the ARO). 
 264. See Roderick M. Hills, Jr. & David N. Schleicher, Balancing the 
“Zoning Budget,” 62 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 81, 83 n.3 (2011) (defining floor area 
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residential, or residential uses on ground floors where residential use 
was previously not allowed.265 If the development project includes 
land purchased from the City of Chicago or if it receives financial 
assistance from the city, then the ARO will apply.266 Lastly, and 
perhaps most important to the overall impact of the housing market 
in Chicago, the ARO will apply to any development project part of a 
planned development in a downtown zoning district.267 Altogether, 
forty-nine of Chicago’s seventy-seven zoned community areas268 are 
subject to the most stringent requirements of the ARO.269
Overall, the ARO created and defined three zones of the city 
that represent the housing markets and each zone’s priorities.270 The 
three zones are labeled downtown, higher-income, and low-moderate 
income.271 While the downtown zone is tied to a geographic location, 
higher-income areas are those where 50% or more of the households 
earn more than 60% of the Chicago median income.272 Lower-
moderate income is defined as an area of the city where more than 
50% of households earn less than 60% of the Chicago median 
income, or where the poverty rate is greater than 25%.273 Each ARO 
zone, regardless of income level, corresponds to a geographic region 
of the city.274 Chicago has provided a map for prospective developers 
detailing the location and classification of each zone in the 2015 
                                                                                                       
ratio as a measurement of the floor area of a building in relationship to the area it 
covers on the underlying lot). 
 265. See Dembo & Nordman, supra note 241. 
 266. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(C) (2015). 
 267. See id. § 115(D). 
 268. See 2015 ARO Zones Map, (Oct. 13, 2015), http://www.cityofchicago. 
org/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/general/housing/2015_ARO_Zone_Map_JULY_28_201
5.pdf [https://perma.cc/QA23-GGWS]. 
 269. See Chi., Ill., 2015 Affordable Requirements Ordinance Rules & 
Regulations § 4.2 (Aug. 7, 2015) [hereinafter 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations], 
http://www.cityofchicago.org/content/dam/city/depts/dcd/general/housing/ARO_Rules_8
_7_2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QV7-4M57]. 
 270. See id. art. 3. 
 271. See id. 
 272. See id. (“Higher Income: 50% of households or more earn more than 
60% of the Chicago median income in two of the last three years for which data is 
available; AND Low Poverty: The poverty rate is less than or equal to 25% in two of 
the last three years for which data is available.”). 
 273. See id. (“Lower Income: More than 50% of households earn less than 
60% of the Chicago median income in two of the last three years for which data is 
available; OR High Poverty: The poverty rate is greater than 25% in two of the last 
three years for which data is available.”). 
 274. See id.
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ARO Rules & Regulations.275 The table below, created by the City, 
explains in greater detail how developers will satisfy each ARO 
zone’s requirement:276




















on-site and pay 
no in-lieu fee 
X X X X 
Place at least 1/4 
of the required
10% affordable 























X X X X 
Lease or Sell 









within two miles 




anywhere    X
No on-site units 
– with $225,000
in-lieu premium 
   X
 275. See 2015 ARO Zones Map, supra note 268. 
 276. See 2015 ARO Enhancements Summary, http://www.cityofchicago.org/ 
content/dam/city/depts/dcd/general/housing/ARO_Enhancements_Summary.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/B9AQ-ERRT]. 
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As each zone becomes more restrictive, developers have 
increasingly limited choices in regard to satisfying the ARO’s 
requirements.277 Additionally, as each zone becomes more exclusive, 
developers face the combination of higher in-lieu fees and mandatory 
set-aside construction.278
B. Changes to Mandatory Set-Aside Requirements 
The 2015 revisions to the ARO require private developers to 
provide either on-site or off-site affordable housing in addition to 
optional in-lieu fees.279 Under the original ordinance, developers 
could comply entirely by paying only the in-lieu fees.280 With the 
2015 revision, Chicago is seeking to drastically increase the number 
of affordable units created directly by private developers.281
In order to comply with the 2015 ARO, private developers 
seeking permits to build new residential units must construct 2.5% of 
their affordable units either on-site or off-site within two miles of the 
building.282 Additionally, if the developer seeks to construct offsite, 
then the City requires that the off-site units have the same number of 
bedrooms as those required on-site.283 However, the 2015 ARO 
contains provisions demonstrating that the City will be flexible in 
assessing developers’ proposals.284 For example, one subsection 
 277. See id.
 278. See id. 
 279. See Dembo & Nordman, supra note 241; see, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN.
CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(F)(3) (2015) (“In the downtown districts and in planned 
developments with an underlying downtown district zoning classification, a 
developer of rental units subject to the provisions of subsection (C) must provide at 
least 25% of the required affordable rental units on-site or off-site.”). 
 280. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 110(d)(1) (2007) (“A developer 
subject to the provisions of subsections (b) or (c), may establish affordable housing 
by one or more of the following: (i) the development of affordable housing units as 
part of the residential housing project; (ii) payment of a fee in lieu of the 
development of affordable housing units; or (iii) any combination thereof.”). 
 281. See supra note 242 and accompanying text (describing that from 2003 
to 2007 the Chicago ARO managed to generate only 189 on-site developer-created 
units). 
 282. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations, supra note 269, § 4.2; CHI., ILL.,
MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(F)(3) (2015) (“If the developer elects to provide 
affordable rental units off-site, the off-site affordable rental units must be located 
within a two-mile radius from the residential housing project and in a downtown 
district or higher income area.”). 
 283. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations, supra note 269, § 6.2.3. 
 284. See id. § 6.2.1 (“Developers are encouraged to be creative in meeting 
their off-site obligation. In addition to creating more units than would be possible 
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states that the City will allow the square footage of the off-site units 
to differ from the on-site units pending the City’s approval of the 
overall proposal.285 Below is a table provided by the City, which 
outlines the number of both on-site and off-site units a private 
developer is responsible for building under the 2015 ARO:286












10-14  1  0  1  
15-19  2  0  1  
20-24  2  1  1  
25-29  3  1  1  
30-34  3  1  2  
35-44  4  1  2  
45-49  5  1  2  
50-54  5  1  3  
55-59  6  1  3  
60-64  6  2  3  
65-69  7  2  3  
70-74  7  2  4  
75-84  8  2  4  
85-89  9  2  4  
90-94  9  2  5  
95-99  10  2  5  
100-104  10  3  5  
105-109  11  3  5  
If a private developer chooses287 to comply with the mandatory 
set-aside by constructing units either on-site or off-site, then it may 
                                                                                                       
on-site, the expectation is that the off-site units could be larger and potentially more 
affordable than their on-site counterparts.”). 
 285. See id. § 6.2.3. 
 286. See id. § 4.2. 
 287. Under the 2015 ARO, the developer does have a choice concerning how 
to meet the ARO’s requirements after securing a building permit. However, the 
ARO contains harsh penalties for those developers failing to comply with the ARO 
upon completion of a project. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(N)(1) 
(2015) (“Failure by the developer to pay the required fee in lieu, or provide the on-
site or off-site affordable units required by this section, or sell or rent such 
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choose who handles the units at the close of construction.288 A private 
developer may sell or lease the affordable units to the Chicago 
Housing Authority or another authorized agency.289 If the developer 
chooses this option before a building permit is issued, then the unit is 
subject to a thirty-year term or a thirty-year deed restriction limiting 
those eligible to inhabit the unit.290 Further, if a developer chooses to 
sell or lease at least a quarter of the total affordable units to the 
Chicago Housing Authority or another authorized agency, then the 
remaining in-lieu fees will be reduced by $25,000 per remaining 
unit.291 As a result, a private developer working under the 2015 ARO 
has a strong incentive to turn control over to the city.292 Such an 
incentive and reduction in fees is a unique provision of the 2015 
ARO that will likely have an impact in determining whether the 
mandatory construction requirements are an unconstitutional 
taking.293
C. Changes to In-Lieu Fees 
The most noticeable changes Chicago made to the ARO in 
2015 include incremental increases to the schedule of in-lieu fees.294
For the first year, fees range from $115,000 to $140,000 for each 
                                                                                                       
affordable units in accordance with the requirements of this section, shall be a 
violation of this section punishable by a fine in an amount equal to two times the 
payment of fees in lieu required in subsection (F) and, in the case of a residential 
real estate developer licensed pursuant to Chapter 4-40 of the Municipal Code or 
any successor chapter, the revocation of the developer’s residential real estate 
developer license.”). 
 288. See id. § 6.1. 
 289. See id. (explaining that the criteria for an authorized agency is set by the 
city); see CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(Q) (2015) (“Affordable units 
required to be provided pursuant to this section may be sold or leased to an 
authorized agency . . . .”); see also id. ch. 2-45, § 115(B) (“‘Authorized agency’ 
means the Chicago Housing Authority, the Chicago Low-Income Housing Trust 
Fund, or another non-profit agency acceptable to the city . . . or another housing 
assistance program approved by the city.”). 
 290. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations, supra note 269, § 6.1 
 291. See id. (“If a developer sells or leases at least 2.5 of the total units (1/4 
of the required affordable units) to the CHA or another Authorized Agency, the 
remaining in-lieu fees will be reduced by $25,000 per remaining required affordable 
unit.”). 
 292. See id. 
 293. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 294. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations, supra note 269, § 4.3. 
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affordable unit required.295 After the first year, fees increase to 
$150,000 to $175,000.296
Below is a table demonstrating the fee increases schedule for 
the remainder of 2015 under the revised ARO.297 The monetary value 
represents the cost per unit of each affordable unit not constructed by 
the developer, which will fall into at least 7.5% of total units for 
most Chicago development plans.298 The table is identical to the 
summary of fees as it appears in the Rules & Regulations provided 
by Chicago:299









































Income $50,000 $50,000 n/a n/a n/a n/a 
Higher 
Income $125,000 $125,000 $100,000 $100,000 n/a n/a 
Downtown 
rental $140,000 $175,000 $115,000 $150,000 n/a n/a 
Downtown 
for sale $140,000 $175,000 $115,000 $150,000 $160,000 $225,000 
However, the 2015 changes to the ARO provide a credit 
against an already mandatory density requirement.300 Development 
projects that meet the requirements of the ARO can apply the in-lieu 
 295. See Podmolik, supra note 17 (“A developer could satisfy the rest of its 
requirement by paying smaller fees of $115,000 to $140,000 in the first year of the 
ordinance and $150,000 to $175,000 thereafter.”). 
 296. See id.
 297. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 4.3. 
 298. See id. 
 299. See id. 
 300. See id. art. 2. 
894 Michigan State Law Review  2016 
fees against the payments associated with obtaining a density 
bonus.301 While the developer is still paying fees associated with the 
ARO, the credit toward the density regulation is a form of 
compensation with an impact in determining whether the changes 
amount to an unconstitutional taking.302
In combination, the 2015 changes to the ARO the Chicago City 
Council passed strengthen its effort to increase the supply of 
affordable housing.303 In order to meet this goal, Chicago has 
imposed mandatory set-aside construction on private developers.304
Additionally, private developers are subject to a substantial increase 
to in-lieu fees.305 Altogether, the changes complicate and raise the 
cost306 of private development while simultaneously leaving Chicago 
exposed to a costly legal challenge.307 As a result, the 2015 changes 
to the ARO will not ensure that the City will meet its goal of 
increasing the supply of affordable housing.308
III. AVOIDING A TAKINGS CHALLENGE TO MANDATORY MINIMUM
SET-ASIDE REQUIREMENTS
The complexity of Chicago’s new ARO—its variable 
percentage and fee-shifting scheme—only further complicates 
Chicago’s development and planning system.309 With a more 
complicated system involving more parties and a greater cost of 
development, private entities will realize smaller profits on 
 301. See id.; see also CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 17-4, § 1004(C) (2016) 
(“Cash payments shall be made to the City of Chicago Affordable Housing 
Opportunity Fund to satisfy the requirements of this bonus. Any payments collected 
under this Sec. 17-4-1004-C shall be used and disbursed in accordance with 
subsection (G) of Sec. 2-45-115. Floor area bonuses will be based on a financial 
contribution that reflects the value of land within the surrounding area, based on the 
following formula: Cost of 1 square foot of floor area = 80% x median cost of land 
per buildable square foot.”). 
 302. See supra Section I.C. 
 303. See supra Part II. 
 304. See supra Section II.B. 
 305. See supra Section II.C. 
 306. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247, § 4 (recognizing that “[t]he 
primary barriers to reinvestment in existing rental units and development of new 
ones are lack of ready financing [and] costs of rehab and construction”); see also id.
§ 4.5 (“A barrier to new-housing development as well as substantial rehabilitation is 
the high cost of development, which can easily top $350,000 per unit.”). 
 307. See infra Part III. 
 308. See infra Part III; see also supra note 256 and accompanying text. 
 309. See supra Part II. 
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residential property.310 For example,311 the Home Builders 
Association of Greater Chicago (HBAGC) filed suit against the City 
of Chicago alleging that the ARO creates a taking of private property 
without just compensation.312 Further, the pending Chicago lawsuit is 
another case in a string of challenges to zoning programs that 
demonstrates inclusionary zoning programs are susceptible to costly 
legal challenges.313
With the 2015 changes to the ARO containing a mandatory set-
aside requirement and strong incentives to turn the units over to the 
City, Chicago has exposed itself to a complex takings challenge.314
Because of the nature of takings jurisprudence and the pending 
challenge to the constitutionality of inclusionary zoning programs,315
the 2015 changes to the ARO may be invalidated.316 Instead of 
continuing to pursue inclusionary zoning programs with spotty 
performance histories, municipalities can create a greater number of 
affordable units by instituting a flat regulatory tax on all new 
construction and relaxing existing zoning ordinances.317 Affordable 
housing can be generated by way of deregulated market rather than 
deliberate, complex ordinances that burden rather than encourage 
development.318 As a result, Chicago can meet its goal of increasing 
the affordable housing supply by reducing construction costs the City 
has already recognized as prohibitive.319
A. Takings and Mandatory Set-Aside Requirements 
The most pressing issue with the 2015 Amendments to 
Chicago’s ARO is the inclusion of a mandatory, on-site set-aside of 
affordable units in certain zones.320 The Supreme Court has yet to 
 310. See supra Part II. 
 311. See supra Subsection I.C.1. 
 312. See Complaint for Declaratory Judgment, Home Builders Ass’n of 
Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 27, 2015). 
 313. See supra Part I. 
 314. See infra Section III.A. 
 315. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974 (Cal. 
2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 316. See infra Section III.A. 
 317. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 318. See infra Sections III.A-C. 
 319. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247, § 4.5 (“A barrier to new-
housing development as well as substantial rehabilitation is the high cost of 
development, which can easily top $350,000 per unit.”). 
 320. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 4.2. 
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address an ordinance requiring construction of units on-site as a 
condition to securing a zoning change and building permit.321
Additionally, the HBAGC lawsuit will not address the issue because 
it is a challenge to the 2007 version of the ARO.322 As a result, 
continuing with an inclusionary zoning program that requires 
mandatory construction of units for sale or rent at below market 
prices is ripe for a takings challenge under the Nollan and Dolan line 
of cases.323
First, it must be determined whether the 2015 ARO’s 
mandatory construction provisions meet Nollan’s first prong 
requiring a nexus between the land-use regulation and the benefit 
being conferred on the landowner through the permit.324 As 
demonstrated by the program’s history, the ARO was enacted to 
meet a shortage of affordable housing throughout Chicago.325 It is 
also likely that a nexus exists between the mandatory construction 
requirements and the act of building affordable units.326 However, 
like the easement sought in Nollan, requiring a developer to set aside 
units for low-price sale or rent through a long-term deed would be a 
taking outside the permitting process.327 Further, the benefit 
conferred on the landowner in securing a change to the zoning and 
building permit,328 does not justify requiring a developer to construct 
affordable units.329 Rather, because a developer is seeking to 
independently construct more residential housing, Chicago is 
 321. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1002 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016) (deciding a facial challenge to a 
statute requiring a set percentage of affordable units as opposed to a challenge to an 
action conditioning a building permit on the set-asides). 
 322. See Plaintiff’s Response to Defendant’s 12(b)(6) Motion to Dismiss at 
1, Home Builders Ass’n of Greater Chi. v. City of Chicago, No. 15-cv-8268 (N.D. 
Ill. Dec. 3, 2015). 
 323. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 324. See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 837 (1987) (“In 
short, unless the permit condition serves the same governmental purpose as the 
development ban, the building restriction is not a valid regulation of land use but ‘an 
out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 
432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981))). 
 325. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247. 
 326. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837. 
 327. See id. at 830-32. 
 328. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(B) (2015) (subjecting 
rezoning to permit a change in floor-area ratio from non-residential to residential use 
and rezoning to allow residential uses on ground floors where previously prohibited 
to the requirements of the ARO). 
 329. See Nollan, 483 U.S. at 837-38. 
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mandating that a percentage be made affordable.330 Just like the 
easement sought in Nollan, the 2015 ARO’s mandatory set-asides 
serve a valid government purpose—providing an increase in 
affordable housing—without payment of compensation.331
A reviewing court would proceed to Nollan’s second prong and 
determine the required degree of connection between the condition 
and the impact of the proposed construction.332 Under this prong, it is 
unclear whether the changes in residential zoning—allowing 
residential units to be built on the ground level, in mixed commercial 
areas, or with a higher floor-area ratio—impacts Chicago’s goal of 
increasing affordable housing.333 Nevertheless, imposing additional 
construction costs on developers seeking to increase the number of 
residential units is counterintuitive to increasing the supply of 
housing—affordable or otherwise.334 Further, there is no link between 
the construction of new residential units and the supply of affordable 
units; rather, older units in existence become more affordable in 
comparison to new construction.335 While Nollan’s second prong 
might require a means-end analysis that was overruled in Lingle, the 
test in Nollan exposes the mandatory set-asides to a takings 
challenge.336
Second, Dolan’s “rough proportionality” test clarifies the 
requirements of Nollan’s second prong.337 The test requires that the 
 330. See id. at 837 (“[T]he lack of nexus between the condition and the 
original purpose of the building restriction converts that purpose to something other 
than what it was. The purpose then becomes, quite simply, the obtaining of an 
easement to serve some valid governmental purpose, but without payment of 
compensation.”). 
 331. See id.
 332. See id. at 837-38 (“In short, unless the permit condition serves the same 
governmental purpose as the development ban, the building restriction is not a valid 
regulation of land use but ‘an out-and-out plan of extortion.’” (quoting J.E.D. 
Assocs. v. Town of Atkinson, 432 A.2d 12, 14 (N.H. 1981))). 
 333. See supra note 192 and accompanying text. 
 334. See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 335. Ellickson, supra note 58, at 1185-87 (introducing the concept of 
“filtering” as a possible, organic economic solution that inclusionary programs 
ignore and supplant). 
 336. See Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 548 (2005) 
(overruling the substantial evidence test promulgated by Agins v. City of Tiburon,
447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980), in favor of language from Nollan and Dolan).
 337. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 377 (1994) (“We granted 
certiorari to resolve a question left open by our decision in Nollan v. California 
Coastal Comm’n of what is the required degree of connection between the exactions 
imposed by the city and the projected impacts of the proposed development.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
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exaction—the ARO’s mandatory set-aside units—be roughly 
proportional to the needs created by the development.338 Further, 
roughly proportional can be also thought of “reasonably related.”339
Thus, in a takings challenge, Chicago would have to demonstrate 
that the ARO’s zones and accompanying percentages are reasonably 
related to the impact a development will have on the shortage of 
affordable housing.340 Essentially, Chicago must demonstrate that 
requiring developers seeking building permits for a downtown zone 
to create 2.5% of the affordable units on-site is reasonably related to 
the project’s impact on affordable housing.341 Because the mandatory 
set-aside requirements function through a predetermined map, it 
would be challenging for Chicago to demonstrate that it makes an 
“individualized determination” when placing the condition on each 
permit request.342 While a “mathematical calculation” is not required, 
Chicago will struggle to demonstrate without studies and statistical 
proof that new market-rate construction creates a shortage of 
affordable housing.343 While a municipality has the power to solve 
development-related issues through zoning, the U.S. Supreme Court 
has made it clear that the Fifth Amendment limits such power.344 As 
a result, the 2015 ARO’s fixed percentage of required on-site and 
set-aside units are open to review under both Dolan and Nollan.345
Third, under Koontz, the 2015 ARO’s in-lieu fees are monetary 
exactions that must also satisfy the tests in Nollan and Dolan.346
Similar to the monetary exactions examined in Koontz that were an 
alternative to a physical exaction, the in-lieu fees in the 2007 version 
 338. See id. at 391. 
 339. See id. (“No precise mathematical calculation is required, but the city 
must make some sort of individualized determination that the required dedication is 
related both in nature and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”). 
 340. See id.
 341. See id.; 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 4.2. 
 342. See Dolan, 512 U.S. at 391 (“[T]he city must make some sort of 
individualized determination that the required dedication is related both in nature 
and extent to the impact of the proposed development.”). 
 343. See id.
 344. See id. at 396 (“A strong public desire to improve the public condition 
[will not] warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than the constitutional way of 
paying for the change.” (quoting Penn. Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))).  
 345. See id.
 346. See Koontz v. St. John’s River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 
2599 (2013) (requiring that monetary exactions satisfy the nexus and rough 
proportionality tests). 
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of the ARO were an alternative to set-aside requirements.347
However, for certain downtown zones, the 2015 ARO does not 
provide in-lieu fees as an alternative.348 Rather, in-lieu fees can only 
compose part of a developer’s obligation under the 2015 ARO.349
The Court’s reasoning in Koontz relied on a municipality offering at 
least one scenario that complies with Nollan and Dolan.350 Because 
the 2015 ARO requires a developer desiring to build downtown to 
either build all required set-aside units or build a fraction of the units 
and pay in-lieu fees, the alternative differs from that addressed in 
Koontz.351 In application, the 2015 ARO does not provide a developer 
desiring to build downtown with a purely monetary exaction; rather, 
a percentage of the units must still be constructed in order to achieve 
compliance.352 Therefore, the mandatory set-asides conflict with 
Dolan; and as a result, any partial in-lieu fees do not offer an 
alternative that passes the Nollan and Dolan tests unscathed.353
Finally, the 2015 ARO’s incentives that may be considered 
compensation actually encourage developers to turn over units to 
Chicago.354 One incentive in the 2015 ARO is that developers may 
sell or lease the affordable units to the Chicago Housing Authority—
or an approved agency—in exchange for a $25,000 reduction in in-
lieu fees.355 As a result, there is a strong incentive for the developer, 
seeking a building permit for as little cost as possible, to turn control 
of completed affordable units over to the City.356 In Koontz, the 
 347. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 110(d) (2007) (“A developer 
subject to the provisions of subsections (b) or (c), may establish affordable housing 
by one or more of the following: (i) the development of affordable housing units as 
part of the residential housing project; (ii) payment of a fee in lieu of the 
development of affordable housing units; or (iii) any combination thereof.”). 
 348. See id. § 115(F)(3) (2015) (“In the downtown districts and in planned 
developments with an underlying downtown district zoning classification, a 
developer of rental units subject to the provisions of subsection (C) must provide at 
least 25% of the required affordable rental units on-site or off-site.”). 
 349. See id. 
 350. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (clarifying that a condition to a building 
permit may be constitutional so long as there is at least one alternative that would 
satisfy Nollan and Dolan).
 351. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations art. 4. 
 352. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(F)(3) (2015). 
 353. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (“[S]o long as a permitting authority 
offers the landowner at least one alternative that would satisfy Nollan and Dolan, the 
landowner has not been subjected to an unconstitutional condition.”). 
 354. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 6.1. 
 355. See id. 
 356. See id. 
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Supreme Court expressed concern that property owners applying for 
land-use permits are especially vulnerable to coercion, which the 
unconstitutional-conditions doctrine is meant to protect.357 Because a 
municipality has a large amount of discretion in denying a permit 
request, the Court recognized that a developer seeking a valuable 
permit would be coerced into giving up property in exchange for the 
ability to build.358
Similarly, the 2015 ARO places a condition on a developer’s 
request for change in zoning, which predicates the ultimate request 
for a building permit.359 If Chicago simply required the developer to 
construct the units without imposing a condition on a building 
permit, the exaction would be a clear constitutional taking.360 Since 
developers request changes in zoning and building permits as a way 
to increase the value of the property, Chicago has broad coercive 
power to take from developers.361 The more a change in zoning and 
building permit is worth, the more a developer in Chicago would be 
willing to comply with the 2015 ARO’s set-asides and in-lieu fees in 
order to build the planned residential structure.362 With such an 
incentive to turn over constructed units to the Chicago Housing 
Authority built into the consideration of how a developer will pay for 
the exactions,363 the City is coercing developers into building units 
and turning them over for compensation that amounts to little more 
than a discount on in-lieu fees that may not meet the Nollan and 
Dolan tests.364 Therefore, the 2015 ARO, even with its incentives, 
does not provide developers with a non-coercive alternative.365 The 
 357. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594 (“[L]and-use permit applicants are 
especially vulnerable to the type of coercion that the unconstitutional conditions 
doctrine prohibits because the government often has broad discretion to deny a 
permit that is worth far more than property it would like to take.”). 
 358. See id.
 359. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 5.1. 
 360. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2598 (“A predicate for any unconstitutional 
conditions claim is that the government could not have constitutionally ordered the 
person asserting the claim to do what it attempted to pressure that person into 
doing.”). 
 361. See id. at 2594. 
 362. See id. 
 363. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(Q) (2015); see also 2015 
ARO Rules & Regulations § 6.1 (“If a developer sells or leases at least 2.5 of the 
total units (1/4 of the required affordable units) to the CHA or another Authorized 
Agency, the remaining in-lieu fees will be reduced by $25,000 per remaining 
required affordable unit.”). 
 364. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2594. 
 365. See id. 
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condition placed on building permits is a shortcut to meeting the goal 
of creating affordable housing at the expense of private developers.366
B. Affordable Housing Tax Instead of Mandatory Set-Aside 
Construction Requirements  
In considering the legal challenges that inclusionary zoning 
programs generate, a regulatory tax scheme is a more efficient way 
for Chicago to achieve its goal of increasing the supply of affordable 
housing.367 As a whole, regulatory taxes are an efficient fund-
generating mechanism for Chicago that could be substituted for 
granting building permits conditional upon construction of affordable 
units.368 Rather than denying permits and forcing compliance,369 a flat 
affordable housing tax would allow developers to assess the costs of 
building an affordable unit or decide whether paying the tax makes 
more fiscal sense.370 Further, an affordable housing tax would 
encourage developers to make decisions in real time and on an 
individual basis.371 Such an individual decision suggests that a tax 
would be an alternative condition available during the permitting 
process under Koontz.372
Furthermore, the Supreme Court has treated the payment of 
money differently than exactions or dedications of physical 
property.373 In her dissenting opinion in Koontz, Justice Kagan 
 366. See Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S. 374, 396 (1994) (“A strong public 
desire to improve the public condition [will not] warrant achieving the desire by a 
shorter cut than the constitutional way of paying for the change.” (quoting Penn. 
Coal v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 416 (1922))). 
 367. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247. 
 368. See Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 219, at 686 (“Regulatory taxation 
and fines are more centralized approaches than nuisance law and private 
agreements.”). 
 369. See, e.g., CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(N)(1) (2015) (“Failure 
by the developer to pay the required fee in lieu, or provide the on-site or off-site 
affordable units required by this section, or sell or rent such affordable units in 
accordance with the requirements of this section, shall be a violation of this section 
punishable by a fine in an amount equal to two times the payment of fees in lieu 
required in subsection (F) and, in the case of a residential real estate developer 
licensed pursuant to Chapter 4-40 of the Municipal Code or any successor chapter, 
the revocation of the developer’s residential real estate developer license.”). 
 370. See Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 219, at 707. 
 371. See id. 
 372. See Koontz v. St. Johns River Water Mgmt. Dist., 133 S. Ct. 2586, 2598 
(2013). 
 373. See, e.g., id. at 2600 (“It is beyond dispute that ‘taxes and user fees . . . 
are not “takings.”’ (quoting Brown v. Legal Found. of Wash., 538 U.S. 216, 243 n.2 
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suggested that when the government is merely imposing a general 
liability to pay money, the municipality is indifferent to how the 
affected party elects to comply.374 To conclude that requiring a 
property developer to pay for restoration of off-site wetlands was not 
a taking, Justice Kagan relied on the premise that the payment 
existed independent of the permitting process.375 Such a conclusion 
rested on the assumption that a law imposes an obligation to make 
the payment,376 which in turn requires that a legislature enact a statute 
creating an affordable housing tax.377 When viewed apart from the 
mandatory set-aside requirements, the Chicago City Council could 
recharacterize the 2015 ARO’s in-lieu payment structure as an 
affordable housing tax that a developer must pay to build in certain 
zones.378 If so, Chicago could correct the elements of the 2015 ARO 
most likely to draw a takings challenge—the mandatory set-aside 
requirements—by treating the in-lieu payments as an affordable 
housing development tax.379 However, by taking this avenue, the City 
Council would need to pass the tax through its legislative process.  
With the revenue from a flat affordable housing tax, the 
changes to Chicago’s ARO would not frustrate the program’s 
purpose.380 Instead, the Chicago Housing Authority or a related body 
would have the revenue to purchase, construct, sell, or lease property 
                                                                                                       
(2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting))); Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 528-29 
(1992) (holding that states have broad power to regulate the rent levels a landlord 
may charge without automatically having to pay compensation). 
 374. See Koontz, 133 S. Ct. at 2605 (Kagan, J., dissenting) (“Five Members 
of the Court determined that the law did not effect a taking, distinguishing between 
the appropriation of a specific property interest and the imposition of an order to pay 
money.”).  
 375. See id. at 2606 (“Because the government is merely imposing a ‘general 
liability’ to pay money, and therefore is ‘indifferent as to how the regulated entity 
elects to comply or the property it uses to do so,’ the order to repair wetlands, 
viewed independent of the permitting process, does not constitute a taking.”) 
(internal citations omitted). 
 376. See id. (emphasizing that monetary payments should not be examined in 
light of Nollan and Dolan, but instead Eastern Enterprises v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 
520 (1998) (holding that the government may impose monetary obligations without 
being subject to Takings Clause protections)). 
 377. See supra Subsection I.C.2. 
 378. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 4.3. 
 379. See id. 
 380. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(A) (2015) (stating that that 
the provision should “be liberally construed and applied to achieve its purpose, 
which is to expand access to housing for low-income and moderate-income 
households and to preserve the long-term affordability of such housing”). 
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in any neighborhood of its choice.381 While a flat tax does not 
guarantee that affordable units will be built within higher-priced 
areas, choosing a location for the units would be left to the City.382
The 2015 changes to the ARO have already frustrated the purpose of 
constructing units directly in high-income neighborhoods because 
developers have the option to construct mandatory units off-site.383
The choice to develop off-site affordable units up to two miles away 
from the proposed project effectively moves affordable housing 
away from the desired location.384 As a result, Chicago has made a 
decision inconsistent with holding private developers responsible for 
the City’s side goal of socioeconomic integration.385 With an 
affordable housing tax in place of mandatory set-asides, the Chicago 
Housing Authority or a related body will have complete control to 
place affordable units anywhere in the city.386 Such total control will 
in turn grant the City more freedom than the 2015 changes to the 
ARO.387 Overall, with more authority to place affordable units in 
whatever area the City desires, Chicago will not be dependent on a 
private developer’s choice of whether to build residential units in an 
exclusive area.388 Notwithstanding, if Chicago sought an alternative 
to legal challenges and tax legislation, then it would be better served 
to relax existing zoning ordinances so that construction of affordable 
units is not a barrier to development.389
C. Effects of New Urbanism and Deregulation  
By relaxing current zoning restrictions so that new units cost 
less than in-lieu fees reaching as high as $175,000, Chicago can 
render unnecessary the mandatory set-asides included in the 2015 
changes to the ARO.390 If, in 2001, the Urban Land Institute found 
that 78.2% of developers cited government regulation as a barrier to 
 381. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 382. See supra note 218 and accompanying text. 
 383. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(F)(3) (2015) (“If the 
developer elects to provide affordable rental units off-site, the off-site affordable 
rental units must be located within a two-mile radius from the residential housing 
project and in a downtown district or higher income area.”). 
 384. See id. 
 385. See supra note 228 and accompany text. 
 386. See supra note 217 and accompanying text. 
 387. See CHI., ILL., MUN. CODE ch. 2-45, § 115(F)(3) (2015). 
 388. See id. 
 389. See infra Subsection III.C. 
 390. See 2015 ARO Rules & Regulations § 4.2-.3. 
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urban development,391 then complicating the process with more 
regulations is not a solution. Chicago itself recognized in its Five-
Year Housing Plan that a major barrier to new housing development 
was the cost per unit.392 By forcing developers of land in urban areas 
like Chicago to continually monitor zoning ordinances for changes in 
requirements and fees, complex programs divert resources away 
from building affordable residential housing.393 Instead, deregulating 
land use and relaxing existing zoning ordinances will allow 
developers to keep up with the demand for affordable housing.394
If a municipality in an urban area focused on relaxing zoning 
restrictions like set-backs, floor-area ratios, and usage separation, 
then developers would be able to build more units in desirable 
locations.395 Chicago has also recognized that such changes will 
reduce the cost per unit, which in turn will increase the supply of 
affordable housing without mandatory set-asides.396 Lower prices 
follow the creation of more units, and the development of a mixed-
income neighborhood becomes a possibility.397 However, to create 
neighborhoods with greater socio-economic diversity, a municipality 
must shift its focus from traditional zoning restrictions concerned 
with the location, size, and aesthetic of a building.398 Instead, a 
municipality must relax such restrictions to increase heightened 
levels of density, which results in more units in desired locations.399
By relaxing ordinances barring residential and commercial uses from 
the same areas, municipalities allow development to transform a 
neighborhood into an area with housing within walking distance to 
schools, workplaces, and shopping.400
 391. See supra Subsection I.C.3. 
 392. See Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247, § 4.5 (“A barrier to new-
housing development as well as substantial rehabilitation is the high cost of 
development, which can easily top $350,000 per unit.”). 
 393. See Alternatives to Zoning, supra note 219, at 697-98 (“The existence 
of zoning means that builders, land speculators, civil engineers, architects, financial 
institutions, lawyers, and others involved in land development must maintain 
libraries of local land use regulations and spend time studying them.”). 
 394. See Siegan, supra note 97, at 128. 
 395. See RUSSELL, supra note 231, at 12-13. 
 396. Emanuel & Mooney, supra note 247, § 5.1 (“Denser construction, 
smaller units and reduced parking requirements all contribute to less cost per unit, 
allowing affordability without use of subsidies.”). 
 397. See Smith, Delaney & Liou, supra note 1, at 160. 
 398. See RUSSELL, supra note 231, at 12. 
 399. See id. at 12-13. 
 400. See Lewyn, supra note 220, at 259. 
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As a result, steep in-lieu fees and mandatory set-asides become 
unnecessary, as it is economical for developers to construct 
affordable units in desirable neighborhoods.401 Further, without 
mandatory set-asides, takings challenges like the one to the Chicago 
ARO become moot.402 Overall, an inclusionary zoning program can 
meet its goal of increasing the supply of affordable housing without 
imposing mandates that curb private development.403
CONCLUSION 
With the California Building Industry AssҲn case upholding the 
constitutionality of mandatory set-aside requirements failing to be 
addressed by the Supreme Court,404 an uncertain legal battle looms 
over regulatory takings and inclusionary zoning’s use of mandatory 
set-asides. As demonstrated by the HBAGC lawsuit filed in August 
2015, Chicago will see similar legal challenges in the future.405 The 
2015 revisions to the Affordable Requirements Ordinance that 
require construction of set-aside units on site in addition to voluntary 
in-lieu fees are susceptible to a complex takings challenge.406 By 
focusing legislative efforts on taxation, municipalities can avoid 
takings challenges.407 Finally, by relaxing existing zoning 
restrictions, Chicago and other municipalities with inclusionary 
programs can create affordable housing in dense urban areas.408 As a 
result, developers will create affordable units because it is 
economical to do so, not because the municipality mandates the 
construction and surrender of affordable units.409
 401. See RUSSELL, supra note 231, at 19. 
 402. See supra Subsection I.B.2. 
 403. See supra Subsection I.B.1. 
 404. See Cal. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n v. City of San Jose, 351 P.3d 974, 1006 
(Cal. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 928 (2016). 
 405. See Ori, supra note 9. 
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